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STATE OF UTAH 
ROSE GIBBONS AND AUSTIN K. TIERNAN, 
Appellants, 
vs. 






The complaint in this action is in ejectment simply. 
Thereby it is alleged merely that the plaintiffs, appel-
lants here, together with one Michael Gibbons and one 
Stephen Hays, were the owners and entitled to the 
possession of a tract of land in the Town of Bingham 
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Canyon in Salt Lake County, Utah, described as Lot 
10, Block 4, Pia t "A", Wilkes Official Survey of Bing-
ham Townsite, and that the defendants, respondents 
here, were in possession thereof and wrongfully with-
held possession from plaintiffs; wherefore plaintiffs 
demanded judgment for possession. 
The defendants, respondents here, by their answer 
denied that the plaintiffs, either togethrr with or apart 
from any other person or persons, were owners or en-
titled to the possession of said premises or had any 
right, title or interest therein, and admitted that re-
spondents were in possession thereof and withheld 
possession thereof from plaintiffs' against plaintiffs' 
demand as respondents had a right to do. Further 
answering the complaint the defendants alleged three 
affirmative defemes, each in itself conclusive against 
appellants: (1) 'That the defendant Utah Copper 
Company was seized in fee simple and entitled to the 
possession of said premises; ( 2) that the defendants 
and their predecessors had been in continuous posses-
sion of said premises under claim of title exclusive of 
all other right, adversely to the pretended title of the 
plaintiffs, for more than twenty-five years last past 
before the commencement of said action and had paid 
all taxes that had been levied and assessed upon said 
land and improvements according to law during said 
period-the plea of the statute of limitations to plain-
tiffs' suit at law, the plea of laches not being available 
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to respondents against the form of action selected by 
plaintiffs; and (3) an estoppel resulting from the con-
tinuous, open, notorious and adverse possession of said 
premises by the defendants and their predecessors over 
said period, the sale and conveyance from one to the 
other and the substantial improvement of said premises 
by defendants and their predecessors and the devotion 
thereof over said period to the purposes of a hospital 
for the care and treatment of the sick and injured of 
the Town of Bingham Canyon and in the vicinity therl}-
of, all of which was at all times within plaintiffs' 
knowledge, but that plaintiffs' had allowed said several 
occupants to purchase the premises, possess and im-
prove the same without any manner of protest, notice, 
claim or aSSl)rtion of title thereto. 
The court below found generally in favor of the 
defendants: (1) That the defendant Utah Copper 
Company was seized in fee simple and entitled to the 
possession of said premises without any right or title 
thereto being vested in the plaintiffs; (2) that the de-
fendants and their predecessors at the time of the com-
mencement of said action had been in continuous 
possession of said premises, holding the same under 
claim of title in fee simple, exclusive of all other right, 
adversely to the pretended title of the plaintiffs, for 
more than forty-fin~ years then last past and that the 
defendants, their predecessors and grantors, had paid 
all taxes that had been levied and assessed against said 
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land and the improvements thereupon according to law 
during the thirty years of said period then last past and 
the whole thereof; and (3) that in the year 1878 or 1880 
one S. S. Maxwell entered into the possession of said 
premises, erected a cabin thereupon and constructeJ 
a rock wall along the southerly boundary of said prem-
ises, and from said date continued in the possession of 
said premises under claim of title in fee simple, ex-
clusive of all other right, adversely to the pretended 
title of the plaintiffs ancl their predecessors and grant-
ors, to and until May 26, 1899, when the said S. S. Max-
well conveyed the same to one F. E. Straup, who con-
tinued in like exclusive and adverse possession until 
the 8th day of May, 1901, when he conveyed said prem 
ises to one Charles MoCann; and said Charles McCann 
thereafter continued in like exclusive, adverse possess-
ion to and until the 5th day of October, 1904, when he 
conveyed said premises to one A. L. Castleman, who 
thereupon entered into possession thereof and continued 
in the exclusive, adverse possession under claim of title 
in fee simple until the 30th day of March, 1907, moved 
the cabin theretofore erected by said S. S. Maxwell to 
the rear of said lot and erected thereupon an additional 
two-story frame building at the cost of $4,000.00, and 
devoted said building and premises to the purposes of 
residence and a hospital for the care and treatment of 
the sick and injured in the Town of Bingham Can~·on 
and in the vicinity thereof; that upon the 30th day of 
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March, 1907, A. L. Castleman conveyed said premises 
to one C. N. Ray, who thereupon entered into the poss-
ession thereof and continued in the open, notorious and 
adverse possession to the 30th day of June, 1913, add-
ing to said two-story frame residence, constructed upon 
said premises by said A. L. Castleman, four rooms at 
a cost of approximately $2,000.00 and C. N. Ray 
thereafter devoted said premises and the improvements 
thereon to the purposes of residence and hospital for 
the care of the sick and injured of the Town of Bing-
ham and in the vicinity thereof; that on the 30th day 
of June, 1913, C. N. Ray, conveyed said premises to 
Drs. Davison H. Ray and Bernardo S. 0 'Brien, who 
entered into and continued in the open, notorious, ex-
clusive and adverse possession thereof to and until the 
19th day of April, 1917, when said Bernardo S. O'Brien 
conveyed his interest therein to Davison H. Ray, the 
latter continuing in such open, exclusive and adverse 
possession and devoting said premises to said purposes 
of residence and hospital until his death on the 26th day 
of June, 1920; that thereupon his estate was probated 
and said premises distributed to Elizabeth K. Ray, the 
widow of decedent, who continued in the open, exclusive 
and adverse possession thereof until the 21st day of 
November, 1922, when she conveyed the same, warrant-
ing title thereto to the defendant R. G. Frazier, who 
thereupon entered into the possession of said premisetl 
as the sole and exclusive owner thereof and so continued 
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until the 20th day of September, 1924, when that de-
fendant conveyed the same and warranted title there-
to to the defendant Utah Copper Company; and that 
the defendant R. G. Frazier during the period of his 
occupancy, until the destruction of said improvements 
by fire in the month of September, 1924, devoted said 
improvements and premises to said residence and hos-
pital uses; and that the defendant Utah Copper Com-
pany upon the conveyance to it of said premises enter-
ed into the possession thereof, employed architects and 
let contracts for the erection thereupon of a hospital 
building of a magnitude equal to the needs of said 
Town of Bingham and vicinity, entered upon the con-
struction thereof on the 23rd day of September, 1924, 
and thereafter completed the same on the lOth day of 
April, 1925, at a cost of $23,000.00, and said structure 
has since the completion thereof been devoted to the 
care and treatment of the sick and injured of the Town 
of Bingham and vicinity requiring its facilities. And 
the court further found that said several conveyances 
were made and said several grantees entered into and 
continued in said open, notorious and exclusive possess-
ion in the belief and under claim of title against the 
plaintiffs and all the world, was upon said several 
occasions and at all times since has been \vithin the 
knowledge of the plaintiffs, and that said S. S. Max-
well and said several grantees improved said premises 
by the erection thereupon of said structures and said 
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additions thereto without notice or knowledge that the 
plaintiffs had or claimed any title or interest in or to 
said premises and said plaintiffs and each thereof stood 
by, although possessed of said knowledge, awl allowc(l 
said several occupants to purchase said premises, 
possess and improve the same, as aforesaid, without 
any manner of protest, notice, claim or assertion of 
title to said premises or against said occupants of 
grantees or any thereof until a certain notice by plain-
tiffs' counsel herein by letter addressed to the defend-
ant R. G. ]'razier and dated the 30th day of October, 
1924, which notice was received by the defendant 
_F'razier more than a month after architects had been 
employed, contracts let and the construction of said 
hospital structure had been actually begun by the de-
fendant Utah Copper Company. 
Upon said findings of fact the court below made 
its conclusions of law: (1) That plaintiff's actiou was 
barred by the provisions of Sections 6449 and 6450, 
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917; (2) that plaintiffs were 
estopped from claiming title to said lands and prem-
ises or improvements thereupon; (3) that the defend-
ant Utah Copper Company was the owner in fee simple 
absolute of said premises and that plaintiffs had neither 
right, title nor interest therein of any kind or character; 
and ( 4) that plaintiffs had not proved a cause of action 
against defendants and that the latter were entitled to 
a judgment of dismissal and to their costs. Judgment 
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of dismissal was accordingly entered and the case comes 
to this court on the appeal therefrom by the plaintiffs 
below. 
Appellants claim an undivided interest in a placer 
mining claim in Bingham Canyon, Salt Lake County, 
Utah, known as the McGuire & Company's Placer Min-
ing Claim, U. S. Lot No. 242. This placer claim is in 
conflict with what is commonly known in Bingham a~J 
the Valentine Scrip, the latter being identical with the 
West half of the East half of the Northwest quarter of 
Section 26, Township 3 South, Range 3 West, S. L. 
B. & M. The name Valentine Scrip attached to that 
forty acre tract becauuse it was purchased with Valoi-
tine Scrip-it was not a mineral entry. The premises, 
the possession of which is sought by action, lay 
upon that part of the placer mining claim m 
conflict with the Valentine Scrip. Attention is directed 
to the tracing admitted in evidence below as Exhibit 
B, upon which the premises herein involved and the 
relation thereof to the placer mining claim and the 
Valentine Scrip will be readily observed. 
McGuire & Company's Placer Mining Claim, U. S. 
Lot No. 242 was 
Located August 26, 1875, (Notice of Location 
recorded in the records of the mining district 
August 26, 1875, and in the office of the 
County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, 
February 13, 1880), (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, 
Abstract of Title, Entry No. 1), 
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Entered, (date of payment of purchase price and 
issuance of receiver's receipt) May 28, 1880, 
Patent issued July 30, 1881 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, 
Abstract of Title, ]Jntry No. 4). 
The Valentine Scrip was 
Located, paid for and entered February 9, 1876, 
patent issued July 10, 1876, (Plaintiffs' Ex-
hibit A, Abstract of Title, Entry No. 28). 
Appellants claim title through the locators and pat-
entees of the McGuire & Company's placer mining rlaim. 
The respondents show a good record title to the prem-
ises herein involved from the entryman and patentee 
of the Valentine Scrip, as well as having proved against 
appellants a good title by adverse possession and hav-
ing established as against appellants an estoppel that 
now precludes their asserting their pretended title 




The legal title to the property for the possession of 
which appellants sue in ejectment is in the respondent, Utah 
Copper Company, wherefore the judgment of dismissal made 
and entered by the court belorw should be affirmed. 
Ejectment is purely a legal action and recovery 
therein must be predicated upon a legal title-a mere 
equitable title will not support a judgment. The action 
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can be maintained only on a showing of existing legal 
title in appellants. Appellants' case will accordingly 
stand or fall as that issue may be determined for or 
against them-no equity can aid them. They have 
elected to stand upon their legal title, no doubt 
appreciating the fact that equitable relief would be 
denied them, barred by some fifty years laches, were 
they otherwise entitled to equitable relief. Appellants 
must succeed, if at all, by the strength of their own title 
-not by the weakness of that of their adversaries. 
The placer mining claim wherein lies appellants' 
interest, if any they have, was located as such August 
26, 1875; the Valentine Scrip was located, entered and 
paid for less than six months thereafter, but more than 
four years and a quarter before payment was made for, 
or receiver's receipt issued upon, the placer claim. Pat-
ent actually issued upon the Valentine Scrip July 10, 
1876, nearly four years before payment was made for, 
or receiver's receipt issued upon, the placer claim and 
nearly five years before patent issued upon the placer 
claim. The Valentine Scrip patent was recorded in 
the records of the County Recorder of Salt Lake 
County, Utah, July 25, 1876, (Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, 
Abstract of Title, Entry No. 28), nearly four years be-
fore payment was made for, or receiver's receipt issued 
upon, the placer claim and five years before the patent 
issued upon the placer claim. The government by 
issuing its patent upon the Valentine Scrip divested it-
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self of the legal title thereto. Five years later, when 
the government issued its patent upon the placer min-
ing claim, it conveyed no title to the area in confliet 
with the Valentine Scrip, because it had none to convey, 
having already parted therewith by patent upon the 
Valentine Scrip. 
"At any rate * * * it (the government) 
could not convey property which had already 
passed to others. A patent of the government 
cannot, any more than a deed of an individual, 
transfer what the grantor does not possess.'' (P. 
25, Appellants' Brief). 
The question is not now as to whether or not the 
Valentine Scrip was when entered or patented known 
mineral land, nor whether or not the government had 
been imposed upon by the Valentine Scrip entryman 
and by fraudulent and false affidavits been induced to 
conclude the land non-mineral, unoccupied and open to 
entry and had been prevailed upon to issue the Valen-
tine Scrip patent accordingly, nor whether or not the 
government had been misled by the failure of the placer 
patentees to include iu their abstract of title the prior 
patent to the Valentine Scrip, then actually of record, 
or to otherwise inform the government with reference 
thereto, nor whether or not it was merely an oversight 
all around. This is not a suit to set aside tho senior 
patt>nt and establish in lieu thereof the junior patent, 
nor is it one to have respondents declared trustee of the 
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legal title to appellants' usc-appellants seek no equit-
able relief. Their suit is in ejectment. Appellants' 
cause must stand or fall by their legal title and the 
strength thereof. vVe may perhaps he pardoned for 
being so insistent upon this distinction, because appel-
lants are so perverse in avoiding it and confusing the 
discussion by assuming determinations of fact to be had 
only in an equitable action to avoid the senior patent or 
for declarations of trust while, at the same time, pros-
ecuting their action as one at law wherein the defense 
of laches, otherwise available to respondents and con-
clusive against appellants, is denied respondents. 
Mr .• Justice .B'ield said in the case of Patterson v. 
Tatum, 3 Saw. 164, 18 Feel. Cases, at page 1331: 
''A patent is the instrument hy which tbc 
government, whether State or National, passe~ 
its title; it is the government conveyance. But, 
if the government possess at the time no t:tle, 
none passes by its execution. It is of itself 
evidence of title, only because government being 
the original source of title, the presumption of 
law is that the title remained with the govern-
ment until some other disposition of it is shown. 
But, if an earlier patent is produced, the subse-
quent one ceases to have any operation. The title 
passing by the first conveyance is not affected 
by the second until the first is got out of the 
way. If the first was issued from improper mo-
tives, corrupt actions, erroneous vic~ws of duty, 
or mistaken consideration, as to matter of fact 
or law by the officers of the government to whom 
the execution and issue of patents is intrusted, 
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a court of law can afford no remedy to the sec-
ond patentee; he must resort to a court of equity 
for relief. So, also, if particular facts respecting 
the condition or location of the property must 
be previously ascertained and determined by a 
special tribunal appointed for that purpose, and 
that tribunal has come to erroneous conclusions 
upon which the patent has issued, such conclus-
ions cannot be questioned collaterally, alHl the 
patent be thereby invalidated in the action of 
Pjectment. ReliPf in such cases can only be afford-
ed by a direct proceeding by bill, information, or 
scire facias, either to revoke the first patent, or 
restrain its operation, or to subject, where equit-
able grounds exist, the lanu to certain trusts in 
the first patentee's hands. A court of law in an 
action of ejectment cannot listen to any objec-
tions founded upon such considerations * * * " 
In Hayner 'T· Stanly, 1:3 Fed. 217, Mr .• Justice 
Sawyer, after quoting with approval from 1fr. Justice 
Field's opinion just referred to, continued: 
"This language covers tbe case at bar in all 
particulars. The title passed to Martin by the 
first patent, and there was nothing left upon 
which the second patent could operate. Conced-
ing, for the purposes of the argument, that the 
patent was erroneously given to Martin, when it 
ought to have gone to the subsequent claimants 
and patentees, the title, nevertheless, passed; and 
the only remedy of the injured parties is in 
equity to charge Martin and his grantors, if 
there are ef!uital)le grounds for so doing, ·with a 
trust for their benefit. The legal title 1s m 
Martin, and that must control in ejectment. 
'' * * '~ the inquiry now is, not which 
party ought in fact and in law to have received 
1•) ._, 
the title, hut which party in fact and in law 
has acquired the title; and the determination of 
that queRtion rests wholly upon the patents. 
They go back to the United f-ltatcs, the source of 
title, and the defendant has the elder patent, 
regular}~! iRstwd in pnnmnnce of the law. * * * " 
Sec alRo: 
Bagnell v. Broderick, 1:~ Pet. (:~8 U. S.) 4:36; 
I<'enn v. Holme, 21 How. ( 62 U. N.) 481; 
Langdon v. Slwrwoo<l, ] 24 U. S. 74, <d 8:~. 
Upon page 1] of their brief counsel stnte their 
contention to he that "when the agricnltnral 1wtent 
i:::;sued to B<>nt](>y in 187fi thr United StateR had there-
tofore by solemn Congressional act divested itself of 
Ow right to convey to Bmlil ey, so far at least as the 
two estate:::; eonflict"-this on their theory that the 
title by mineral patent related back to the date of the 
notice of location. If by this language counsel mean to 
say the United States upon the occasion of the issuance 
of the Valentine Scrip patent on July 10, 1876, had 
parted with its title to the area in eonflict with the 
placer claim and that, thrrcfore, the United States had 
110 jurisdiction ov<~r that area, havi11g partc~d ~with its 
title to another, aml as to such ::trea the Valentine Scrip 
patent was void, they have fnllen into that indefinite-
ness of exprP"sion of ~whi(•.h we eomplnin Rnrl, for rca-
sonR of 1vhich they onl~T al'e aware, have avoided a 
direct statement of the conditiom; upon which they 
could hope to attain the Pnd they Reek. IIad the govern 
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ment parted with its title to the area in conflict upon 
the occasion of the issuance of the Valentine Scrip 
patent 1 \Vas the government then without jurisdiction 
as to that area'~ ~Was the Valentine Scrip patent as to 
that area void and not merely voidable~ These ques-
tions must be amnvered in the affirmative if appellants 
are to succeed, for if the United States was still vested 
with the title to the area in conflict and it still had the 
right or jurisdiction to investigate and determine cer-
tain facts precedent to patent, i. e., the mineral or non-
mineral character of the land, whether or not it were 
occupied or vaeaut and open to non-mineral: entry, 
whether or not there had been a discovery of mineral, 
whether or not the placer claim had been staked on the 
ground and \vhether or not those things generally had 
been done that the law required precedent to a valid 
placer location, then appellants must fail; because al-
though under those circumstances the issuance of the 
non-mineral Valentine Scrip patent had been irregular, 
in error and to a party not entitled thereto, the result of 
mistake or even deliberate fraud, the title was vested 
in the government, the government was not without 
jurisdiction, its dealings with the land in question wen) 
within its powers and in the course of duty imposed 
upon its officers, the Valentine Scrip patent was void 
able merely, not void, and it was when issued and al-
ways thereafter remained conclusive against collateral 
attack in an action at either law or equity. 
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In Moore v. Hobbins, 96 U. S. 530, at 532, the Su-
preme Court of the United States held as follows upon 
this subject: 
'' * * * when the patent has * * * 
been issued, delivered and accepted, all right to 
control the title or to decide on the right to the 
title has passed * * * from the Executive 
Department of the government. A moment's con-
sideration will show that this must, in the nature 
of things, be so. We are speaking now of a case 
in which the officers of the department have acted 
within the scope of their authority. The offices 
of register and receiver and commissioner are 
created mainly for the purpose of supervising the 
sales of the public lands; and it is a part of their 
daily business to decide when a party has by pur-
chase, by pre-emption, or by any other recognized 
mode, established a right to receive from the 
government a title to any part of the public do-
main * * * if the patent issued under the 
seal of the United States, and signed by the Pres-
ident, is delivered to and accepted by the party, 
the title of the government passes with this de-
livery. -with the title passes away all authority 
or control of the Executive Department over the 
land, and over the title which it has con-veyed. It 
would be as reasonable to hold that any private 
owner of land who has conveyed it to another 
can, of his own volition, recall, cancel, or annul 
the instrument which he has made and delivered. 
If fraud, mistake, error, or wrong has been done, 
the courts of justice present the only remedy. 
These courts are as open to the United States to 
sue for tho cancellation of the deed or reconvey-
ance of the land as to individuals; and if the 
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government is the party injured, this IS the 
proper course. 
"'A patent' says the court in United States 
v. Stone (2 Wall. 525), 'is the highest evidence of 
title, and is conclusive as against the government 
and all claiming under junior patents or titles, 
until it is set aside or annulled by some judicial 
tribunal. In England this was originally done 
by scire facias; but a bill in chancery is found a 
more convenient remedy.' " 
And in St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co. v. Green, 
13 Fed. 208, where the Circuit Court for the District of 
Colorado entered into the following discussion of the 
question,-
"'This Is an action of ejectment, * * * 
The questions now to be considered arise upon 
demurrer to the third amended answer. By this 
pleading the defendants seek to attack, in this 
action of ejectment, the patent under which the 
plaintiff claims. 
"First, that the patent was obtained by the 
patentee, Mr. Starr, under whom the plaintiff 
claims, by fraud, conspiracy, bribery, and per-
jury; * * • 
''Another action of ejectment, arising upr 
this identical patent, was brought in this court 
some time since, and was tried here. The court 
in that case admitted certain evidence ten,1ing 
to show that the officers of the land departlY'c-nt 
had issued the patent improperly and erronel)nS· 
ly. The judgment of the court in that case has 
been reversed, and an elaborate opinion pro-
nounced by Mr. Justice Field, is now before us. 
In that opinion, the doctrine is laid down so 
clearly and emphatically as to leave no room for 
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doubt, that, in an action of ejectment, the defend-
ant cannot be permitted to attack a patent, evC'n 
upon the ground of fraud. He must resort to r 
court of equity. 
''After citing numerous cases in the supreme 
court of the United States, the opinion in the 
case just referred to proceeds as follows: 
'According to the doctrine thus express-
ed, and the cases cited in its support,-anil 
there are none in conflict with it,-there 
can be no doubt that the court below erred 
in admitting the record of the proceedings 
upon which the patent was issued, in order 
to impeach its validity. The judgment of the 
department, upon their sufficiency, was not, 
as already stated, open to contestation. lf, 
in issuing a patent, its officers took mistaken 
views of the law, or drew erroneonuFl con-
clusions from the evidence, or acted from 
imperfect views of their duty, or even from 
corrupt motives, a court of law can afford 
no remedy to a party alleging that he iR 
thereby aggrieved. He must resort to a 
court of equity for relief. * * *' 
* * * * * * 
"Without reading further from that opmwn, 
it is sufficient to say that the doctrine is fully and 
elaborately discussed, and numcrom; cases are 
cited as establishing the doctrine that a patent of 
the United States, in an action of ejectment, can-
not be collaterally attacked. * * * 
''It is hardly necessary to say that an ac-
tion of ejectment is pre-eminently an action in 
which the legal title must prevail, and therefor•>. 
one in which, according to this ruling, the patent 
cannot be attacked collaterally. * * *" 
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The mere filing with the Recorder of the mining 
district of a notice of location of the placer mining 
claim did not divest the United States of title to the 
area in conflict. The character of the interest obtained 
by the perfPcted, valid location of a mining claim was 
defined by the Supreme Court of the United States m 
Black v. Elkhorn Mining Company, 163 U. S. 445, 16 
Sup. Ct. Rep. 1101, 41 L. ed. 221, as follows: 
"Mr. ,Justice Miller, in the course of his 
opinion in Forbes v. Gracey, (94 U. S. 762) 
stated: 'It is very true that Congress has by 
statutes permitted individuals to dig out and con-
vert to their own use the ores containing the 
precious metals which are found in the lands be-
longing to the government, without exacting or 
receiving any compensation for those ores and 
without requiring the. miner to buy or pay for tho 
land. It has gone further, and recognized the 
possessory rights of these miners, as asserted 
among themselves by rules, which have become 
laws of the mining districts as regards mining 
claims, but in doing this it has not parted with 
the title to the land except in cases where the 
land has been sold in accordance with the pro-
visions of the law upon that subject'. 
''The interest in a mining claim prior to 
the payment of any money for the granting of a 
patent for the land, is nothing more than a right 
to the exclusive possession of the land based 
upon conditions subsequent, a failure to fulfill 
which forfeits the locator's interest in the claim . 
• , ,,, * " (Italics ours). 
and in the same case in the Circuit Court of Appeals 
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for the Ninth Circuit (52 Fed. 859), the decision being 
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, 
it was said that it was a possessory right merely that 
was conferred upon the locator of a mining claim, and 
proceeded: 
'' * * * Congress has also provided that 
the locators of such claims may purchase the 
property, and has prescribed the terms and con-
ditions upon which the government title may be 
thus acquired. Rev. St. §§ 2325-2340. But the 
locator is not compelled to buy. He may never 
do so. * * * In the case under consideration 
no such application was made prior to the 
death of the husband of the plaintiff in error. 
The government's offer to sell this mining claim 
had not been accepted, and no step of any natur·~ 
looking to the acquisition of the title of the Unit-
ed States thereto had been taken by the locators, 
or their successors in interest, up to and for a 
long time after that event. The title of the United 
States was therefore then absolutely free and un-
incumbered. No legal reason existe<i why Con-
gress could not then have withdrawn the property 
from sale, or made any other dispOF;ition of it. 
That the government, in its wisdom an<i g"·?nor-
osity, continued to permit the locators to enjoy 
the fruits of its property by extracting the min-
erals therefrom, and that a right thus conferred 
upon and enjoyed by locators constitutes proper 
ty, and property often of groat value, which is 
treated by the courts and legislatures of various 
states as realty in dealing with the rights of 
claimants thereto as between themselves and 
third parties, in no respect affect the trne title 
to the property, which aU the time remained in 
20 
the United States' free and unincumbered, because 
its offer to sell had not been accepted, and it had 
done nothing to part with its title. * * * 
While the possessory right to which referenc(~ 
has been made constituted in the locator, owning 
and enjoying it, property of value, which could 
be sold, transferred, mortgaged, and inherited, 
and, vve may add, forfeited by abandonment, it 
constittded, and could constitute, no legal interest 
or estate in the property as against the United 
States or its grantee. '~ * * " (Italics ours). 
"Location" has been defined as "the act or series 
of acts by which the right of exclusive possession of 
mineral veins and the surveys of mineral lands is vested 
in the locator". Lindley on Mines, 3d Ed. Vol. 2, § 327. 
To the validity of mining locations the Act of Congress 
prescribes the necessary precedents of (1) discovery 
and (2) the marking of the location on the ground so 
that its boundaries can be readily traced. § 2, A. C. 
1May 10, 1872, R. S. § 2320, § 5 A. C. May 10, 1872, R. S. 
§ 2324. The proof of recording and marking a claim 
will not authorize the court to presume a discovery. 
Smith v. Newell, 86 Fed. 56, (Gir. Ct. D. Utah). A 
single discovery within a placer location does not con-
clusively establish the mineral character of all the land 
within it and this question is open to investigation by 
the Department at any time until patent is issued. 
Lindley on Mines, 3d Ed., Vol. 2, § 438. There is no 
implication from patent that these essential conditions 
precedent to a valid location had been performed at 
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any time prior to the issuance of receiver's final re-
ceipt, which as to the McGuire & Company's placer 
claim was on May 28, 1880, four and one-half years 
after the location, entry and payment for the Valentine 
Scrip and nearly four years after the actual issuance 
of patent upon the Valentine Scrip. What the rules of 
the mining- district were or the nature of the compliance 
therewith, if any, the record below does not disclose; 
appellants offered no proof thereupon. 
Counsel rely upon the case of Creede & Cripple 
Creek Mining- & Milling Company vs. Uinta Tunnel Min-
ing & Transportation Company, 196 U. S. :3:37, 25 Sup. 
Ct. Rep. 266, 49 L. ed. 501. But it was held in that 
case that the mineral patent raised no presumption as 
to the date of plaintiff's discovery other than that a 
discovery had been made at the time of entry, that the 
mere ex parte statement as to the date of di:,;covery con-
tained in the location notice was not evidentiary, that 
without a discovery there could be no location, that 
"doubtless a locator does not acquire the right of ex-
clusive possession until he had made a valid location, 
and discovery is essential to its validity'', that "an 
entry, sustained by a patent, is conclusive evidence that 
at the time of the entry there had been a valid location, 
, and such valid location implies as one of its conditions 
a discovery", and that "it must be remembered that 
the discovery and the marking on the ground are not 
matters of record hut in pais and, if disputed in an 
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adverse suit or otherwise, must be shown, as other like 
facts, by parol testimony", that "it is undoubtedly true 
that discovery is the initial fact. The language of the 
statute makes that plain, and parties may not go on 
the public domain and acquire the right of possession 
by the mere performance of the acts prescribed for a 
location", that by the issuance of patents the govern-
ment had made no determination as to the date of dis-
covery other than that at the time of receiver's receipt 
or entry such discovery had been made. 
The mineral patent issued upon McGuire & Com-
pany's placer claim, as we have just observed, raised 
no presumption of a discovery at any time prior to 
entry, May 28, 1880, nor any presumption of the stak-
ing of the claim on the ground, hence no presumption 
of a valid location prior to that date. Not only is there 
no presumption of a valid location upon the occasion of 
either entry or patent of the Valentine Scrip, but by all 
the authorities the issuance of the non-mineral patent 
was such an adjudication against the mineral character 
of the land and of its unoccupied and unappropriated 
condition as to be conclusive upon a collateral attack in 
an action at either law or equity. It is such an adjudica-
tion against the mineral claimant because by the act of 
Congress authorizing the issuance of the Valentine 
Scrip (17 U. S. Stat. at Large, 649) it was provided 
that "the claimant * * * may select and shall be 
allowed patents for an equal quantity of the unoccupied 
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and unappropriated public land of the United States 
not mineral * * * " 'rhe issuance of the patent 
upon the Valentine Scrip raises a presumption conclus-
ive in an action at law and in all equitable actions other 
than by direct attack, that ''all previous steps had been 
regularly taken to justify making the patent", and an 
adjudication conclusive in a suit at law, and in all 
equitable actions other than by direct attack ''as to all 
matters properly determinable- by the Land Depart-
ment'', conclusive therefore upon the non-mineral char-
acter of the land and upon the fact that it was then un-
occupied and unappropriated, a determination against 
the discovery and the staking of the claim upon the 
ground, both necessary under the act of Congress to it:'l 
valid location as a placer claim. This determination 
was within the scope of the authority of the Land De-
partment because the government held the title, the dis-
position thereof was exclusively in the Land Depart-
ment, whose duty it was to make all necessary investi-
gations and determinations with reference thereto and 
in the light thereof to convey the land to the one so 
deemed entitled. The jurisdiction of the Land Depart-
ment was invoked by the application of the non-mineral 
entryman for the Valentine Scrip patent, and the duty 
was imposed upon it by law to investigate and deter-· 
mine whether or not the land entered was of such a 
character as to permit of its purchase by Valentine 
Scrip, that is to say, non-mineral, unoccupied and un-
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appropriated, as to all of which the patent to the Valen-
tine Scrip evidences the Department's final determina-
tion, conclusive against collateral attack as just stated. 
As held by the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth .Circuit in United States v. Beaman, 242 Fed. 
876 at 879: 
" * * * A patent of the United States 
is an adjudication by the quasi judicial tribunal, 
the Land Department, to which the government 
has intrusted the determination of the claims of 
applicants for titles to the public lands, and a 
conveyance of the title to the lands which the 
patent describes to the patentee. It raises the 
presumption of right and regularity in all the 
proceedings antedating it and of perfect title in 
the grantee. In the case at bar it was an adjudi-
cation of the Land Department that the land it 
patented was not mineral land, and this and 
every other adjudication it made that was essent-
ial to the validity of the patent was impervious 
to collateral attack and presented a strong pre-
sumption that its decision was right". (Cases 
cited). 
And in re Wo-Gin-Up's Estate, 57 Utah 36, the Su-
preme Court of this state quoted with approval from 
Ferry v. Street, 4 Utah 535, 11 Pac. 575, as follows: 
"This court, in Ferry v. Street, 4 Utah at 
page 535, 11 Pac. at page 575, quotes in support 
of the conclusions reached in that case from 
Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U. S. 447, 1 Sup. Ct. 
389, 27 L. ed. 226, as follows: 
'That (the land) department, as we 
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have repeatedly said, was estabilshed to sup-
ervise the various proceedings whereby a 
conveyance of the title from the United 
States to portions of the public domain is 
obtained, and to see that the requirements of 
different acts of Congress are fully com-
plied with. Necessarily, therefore, it must 
consider and pass upon the qualifications of 
the applicant, the acts he has performed to 
secure the title, the nature of the land, 
whether it is of the class which is open to 
sale. Its judgment upon these matters ~s 
that of a special tribunal, and is unassailable, 
except by direct proceedings for its annul-
ment or limitation. Such has been the uni-
form language of this court in repeated 
decisions.' '' 
And in Lindley on Mines, 3d Ed., Vol. 3, page 1895, § 
779: 
''It has been frequently determined that the 
patent is conclusive evidence of the character of 
the land. If the instrument was issued pursuant 
to the laws governing agricultural lands, the land 
embraced therein will be conclusively presumed 
to be agricultural, and if under the mining laws, 
to be mineral. · 
"We have heretofore alluded to patents is-
sued to agricultural claimants under the pre-
emption and homestead laws, and have ohserve(l 
that these laws provided that no lands on which 
are situated any known salines or mines should 
be liable to entry. When a patent issues to the 
agricultural claimant, it would seem to be a con-
clusive adjudication that the lands were agricul-
tural, contained no known mines, and the patent 
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is immune from collateral attack. In other words, 
agricultural patents fall within the general ruin 
above stated." 
It is uot now in this action a question of the cor-
rectness of the Laud Department's decision, but rather 
of the Land Department's right to inquire and deter-
mine. If the Land Department's decision was in erro1' 
the law provided a method of review. If the Valen-
tine Scrip patent had been issued by the Land Depart-
ment by mistake, or if that Department had been im-
posed upon, only a court of equity could have granted 
the relief appellants are endeavoring to obtain by this 
ejectment suit. If the action is to be determined upon 
equitable principles it must be made equitable in form 
because appellants have waited fifty years to assert 
their elaim of title and respondents should not be de-
nied the right to avail themselves of appellants' laches 
as a defense. Respondents cannot plead laches to a suit 
in ejectment. 
In the case of Burke v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 
234 U. S. 669, 34 Sup. Ct. 907, 58 L. ed. 1527, the court 
held: 
''The exclusion of mineral lands is not con-
fined to railroad land grants, but appears in the 
homestead, desert-land, timber and stone, and 
other public land laws, and the settled course of 
decision in respect of all of them has been that 
the character of the land is a question for the 
Land Department, the same as are the qualificn-
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tions of the applicants and his performance of 
the acts upon which the right to receive the title 
depends, and that when a patent issues it is to 
be taken upon a collateral attack, as affonling 
conclusive evidence of the non-mineral character 
of the land and of the regularity of the acts and 
proceedings resulting in its issue, and, upon a 
direct attack, as affording such presumptive 
evidence thereof as to require plain and con-
vincing proof to overcome it. (Cases cited). 
* * * * * * * 
"Of course, if tho land officers are induced 
by false proofs to issue a patent for mineral 
lands under a non-mineral land law, or if they 
issue such a patent fraudulently or through 'l 
mere inadvertence, a bill in equity, on the part 
of the government, will lie to annul tho patent 
and regain the title, or a mineral claimant who 
then had acquired s1tch rights in the land as to 
entitle him to protection may maintain a bill to 
have the patentee declared a trustee for him; but 
such a pa.tent is merely voidable, not void, 
"" "" "" " (Cases cited): 
* * * * 
"Taking up the several questions m the 
light of what we have here said, we answer them 
as follows: 
* * 
"2. Dioes a patent to a railroad company 
under a grant which excludes mineral lands, as 
in the present case, but which is issued without 
any investigation upon tho part of the officers of 
the Land Office or of the Department of the In-
terior as to the quality of the land, whether agri-
cultural or mineral, and without hearing upon 
or determination of the quality of the lands, 
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operate to convey lands which are thereafter as, 
certainecl to be mineral? 
''ANSWER-A patent issued in such circum-
stances is irregularly issued, undoubtedly so; 
but, as it is the act of a legally constituted 
tribunal, and is done within its jurisdiction, it is 
not void, and therefore passes the title * * * 
subject to the right of the government to attack 
the patent hy a direct suit for its annulment if 
the land was known to be mineral when the pat-
ent issued * * * " 
"4. If the reservation of mineral lands as 
expressed in the patent is void, then is the pat-
ent upon a collateral attack, a conclusive and 
official declaration that the land is agricultural, 
and that all the requirements preliminary to the 
issuance of the patent have been complied with~ 
"A ~swER-lt is conclusive upon a collateral 
attack." (Italics ours). 
Its jurisdiction invoked by the non-mineral entry-
man's application to purchase a part of the public do-
main, title to which was then in the United States gov-
emmcmt, the Land Department made an investigation 
to determine the character of the land applied for, aml 
whether or not it was unoccupied and open to entry, 
and the Land Department made its decision thereon in 
favor of the non-mineral entryman. We offered in the 
court belo"r (Tr. pages 13 and 14) a photostat copy 
of the proceedings before the Land Department upon 
the Valentine Scrip application, entry and patent, but 
appellants objected to its admission and the court sus, 
tained the objection upon the ground, (upon which the 
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objection was made), that the Valentine Scrip patent, 
the senior patent, did not require in aid of its validity 
and conclusiveness the record upon which it issued, for 
all presumptions of law were in favor of its validity and. 
the regularity thereof. But counsel, while objecting to 
the proof we tendered, asserted that the Land Depart-
ment erred in finding that the land within the Valen-
tine Scrip was non-mineral, unoccupied and open tO 
entry. Whether or not the land Department erred is 
not a matter that can be determined in this suit in 
ejectment. That question is not in issue here. ''The 
test of jurisdiction is not 'right decision,' but the right 
to enter upon the inquiry and make some decision''-
in this instance it cannot be denied that the Department 
had the right to enter upon the inquiry as to whether 
or not the land applied for by the non-mineral entry-
man was non-mineral, unoccupied and open to entry and 
make some decision. The senior patent issued and all 
presumptions are against any error in the issuance 
thereof upon collateral attack in an action at either law 
or equity. 
Section 122, 18 R. C. L., page 1221, 1s m part as 
follows: 
"The government is, of course, an interested 
party in the determination of the character of 
public land; and it has imposed the duty of 
determining the mineral or non-mineral character 
of public land on the land department. The ques-
tion of the mineral or non-mineral character of 
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public land is an open one until the acquisition 
of complete title to the land. * * * In a con-
test between mineral and non-mineral claimant::; 
it is incumbent upon the former to show as a 
present fact that the character of the land is such 
that mineral can be obtained from it in such 
quantity and quality as to make it more valuable 
for mining than for agricultural. * * * 
Where the same land may he valuable for both 
mineral and agricultural purposes, it is a ques-
tion of fact whether it is mineral land within the 
meaning of the federal statute, and the contro-
versy is settled by the land department, by de-
termining whether the land is more valuable for 
the one purpose or the other.'' 
·with the issuance of the Valentine Scrip or senior 
patent the jurisdiction of the Land Department ceased 
and its every act subsequent thereto with reference to 
the property so patented was wholly void. 
Section 121, 18 R. C. L., page 1220, is m part as 
follows: 
''The land department of the government 
was established to supervise the various proceed-
ings whereby a conveyance of the title from the 
United States to portions of the public domain is 
obtained, and to see that the requirements of dif-
ferent acts of Congress are fully complied with. 
It must, therefore, consider and pass upon the 
qualifications of the applicant, the acts he has 
performed to secure the title, the nature of the 
land, and whether it is of the class which is ope1J 
to sale. Prior to issuance of the patent the land 
department has control over the disposition of 
the public lands, and may inquire whether the 
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original entry was in conformity with the act 
of Congress. * * * But one who has obtain-
ed a patent from the government cannot be call-
ed to answer in regard to it before tho officers of 
the land department. The only way in which 
his title can be then impeached is by suit." 
rrhe Supreme Court of the United States held. in 
Iron Silver Mining Co. v. Campbell, 135 U. S. 286 at 
301, 10 Sup. Ct. 765, 34 U. S. L. Ed. 155, as follows : 
"\Ve have more than once held that when 
the government has issued and delivered it" 
patent for lands of the United States, the con-
trol of the department over the title to such land 
has ceased, and the only way in which the title 
can be impeached is by a bill in chancery; and 
we do not believe that, as a general rule, the 
man who has obtained a patent from the govern-
ment can be called to answer in regard to that 
patent before the officers of the land department 
of the government.'' 
No doctrine of relation can apply as to this area 
m conflict from the issuance of the junior patent, 
which as to that area was void. The Land Department 
cannot divest itself of title upon the issuance of tho 
senior patent and thereafter defeat the senior patent 
by the issuance of a junior patent and the application 
thereto of some doctrine of relation whereby to give 
the title of the junior patentee an origin prior to the 
senior patent. Before the jurisdiction of the Land De-
partment could have been revived and the junior patent 
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issued the United States government must have institut-
ed an action by way of direct attack in a court of equity 
as a result whereof the senior patent had been avoided 
and the land in dispute had reverted to the public do-
main, again within the jurisdiction of the Land Depart-
ment. \V"e are aware of no authority to the contrary. 
It has been held by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Steel v. St. Louis Smelting Etc. Co., 
106 U. S. 447, at 450, 1 Sup. Ct. 389, 27 U. S. L. Ed. 226, 
as follows: 
"That department, (the Land Department) 
as we have repeatedly said, was established to 
supervise the various proceedings whereby a 
conveyance of the title from the United States to 
portions of the public domain is obtained, and to 
see that the requirements of different acts of 
Congress are fully complied with. Necessarily, 
therefore, it must consider and pass upon the 
qualifications of the applicant, the acts he has 
performed to secu·re the title, the nature of the 
land, and whether it is of the class which is open 
to sale. Its judgment upon these matters is that 
of a special tribunal, and is unassailable except 
by direct proceedings for its annulment or limita-
tion. Such has been the uniform language of 
this court in repeated decisions. 
"In .T ohnson v. Towsley, the effect of the 
action of that department was the subject of 
special consideration. And the court applied the 
general doctrine, 'that when the law has con-
fided to a special tribunal the authority to hear 
and determine certain matters arising in the 
course of its duties, the decision of that tribunal, 
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within the scope of its authority, is conclusive up-
on all others,' and said, speaking by Mr. Justice 
Miller, 'that the action of the land office in 
issuing a patent for any of the public land, sub-
ject to sale by pre-emption or otherwise is con-
clusive of the legal title, must be admitted un-
der the principle above stated, and in all courts, 
and in all forms of judicial proceedings, where 
this title must control, either by reason of the 
limited powers of the court, or the essential 
character of the proceeding, no inquiry can be 
permitted into the circumstances under which it 
was obtained.' 13 Wall. 72, 83. 
. "" "" . . . . 
" "" "" • The validity of a patent of the 
government cannot be assailed collaterally be-
because false and perjured testimony may have 
been used to secure it, any more than a judg-
ment of a court of justice can be assailed col-
laterally on like ground. 
• • "" "" • * • 
'' * * * So with a patent for land of 
the United States, which is the result of the 
judgment upon the right of the patentee by that 
department of the government, to which thl 
alienation of the public lands is confided, the 
remedy of the aggrieved party must be sought 
by him in a court of equity, if he possess such 
an equitable right to the premises as would gwe 
him the title if the patent were out of way. If 
he occupy with respect to the land no such pos-
ition as this, he can only apply to tho officers of 
the government to take measures in its name 
to vacate the patent or limit its operation. It 
cannot be vacated or limited in proceedings 
where it comes collaterally in question. It can-
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not be vacated or limited by the officers them-
selves; their power over the land is ended when 
the patent is issued and placed on the records of 
the department. This can be accomplished only 
by regular judicial proceedings, taken in the 
name of the government for that special pur-
pose." (Italics ours). 
The attention of the court 1s respectfully directed 
to the case of Ferry v. John L. Street, 4 Utah 521. We 
think the principles therein so clearly stated are con-
trolling upon the questions here under discussion. We 
will not quote from the decision, but we do commend 
it to the present consideration of this court. 
As said in Carpentier v. Montgomery, 80 U. S. 480, 
496, 20 L. Ed. 698: 
"The case is somewhat analogous to that 
of patents granted upon a pre-emption right for 
public land. Whilst the patent in that case con-
fers the legal title, and admits of no averment to 
the contrary, the patentee may be subjected in 
equity to any just claim of a third party, even 
to the extent of holding the title for his sole use. 
The grounds of equitable jurisdiction in such 
cases are stated in the opinion of this court in 
the recent case of Johnson v. Towsley." 
And in Johnson v. Towsley, 80 U. S. 72, 83, the court 
held: 
'' • • • That the action of the land of-
fice in issuing a patent for any of the public land, 
subject to sale by pre-emption or otherwise, is 
conclusive of the legal title, must be admitted un-
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cler the principle above stated, and in all courts, 
and in all forms of judicial proceedings, where 
this title must control, either by reason of the 
limited powers of the court, or the essential char-
acter of the proceeding, no inquiry can be per-
mitted into the circumstances under which it was 
obtained. On the other hand there has always 
existed in the courts of equity the power in cer-
tain classes of cases to inquire into and correct 
mistakes, injustice, and wrong in both judicial 
and executive action, however solemn the form 
which the result of that action may assume, when 
it invades private rights; and by virtue of this 
power the final judgments of courts of la\v have 
been annulled or modified, and patents and other 
important instruments issuing from the crown, 
or other executive branch of the government, 
have been corrected or declared void, or other 
relief granted. No reason is perceived why the 
action of the land office should constitute an ex-
ception to this principle. * * * And so, if for 
any other reason recognized by courts of equity, 
as a ground of interference in such cases, the 
legal title has passed from the United States to 
one party, when, in equity and good conscience, 
and by the laws which Congress has made on 
the subject, it ought to go to another,' a court of 
equity will,' in the language of this court in the 
case of Stark v. Starrs, just cited, 'convert him 
into a trustee of the true owner, and compel him 
to convey the legal title'. In numerous cases this 
has been announced to be the settled doctrine of 
this court in reference to the action of the Jan;l 
officers. * * * 
"Not only has it been found necessary in 
the interest of justice to hold thi:;; doctrine in re-
gard to thfl decisions of the land officers of thfl 
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United States, but it has been found equally 
necessary in the States which have had a sys-
tem of land sales. Numerous cases are found in 
the courts of Kentucky and Virginia, where 
they have, by proceedings in equity, es-
tablished the junior patent to be the title 
instead of the elder patent, by an inquiry into 
the priority of location or some other equitable 
matter, or have compelled the holder of the title 
under the patent to convey, in whole or in part, 
to some persons whose claim rested on matters 
wholly anterior to the issuing of the patent. There 
is also a similar course of adjudication in the 
State of Pennsylvania, and we doubt not cases 
may be found in other States. Several of thP 
Kentucky cases have come to this court, where 
the principle has been uniformly upheld. 
• • • "' "' "' * 
'' * • * This court "' * * has con-
stantly asserted the right of the proper courts 
to inquire, after the title had passed from the 
government, and the question became one of pri-
vate right, whether, according to the established 
rules of equity and the acts of Congress con-
cerning the public lands, the party holding that 
title should hold absolutely as his own, or as trus-
tee for another. * * * " (Italics ours). 
We will now proceed to a discussion of the cases 
upon which appellants rely, viz.: 
Uinta Tunnel Mining & Transportation Co. v. 
Creede & Cripple ,Creek Mining & Milling 
Co., 119 Fed. 164; 
Noyes v. Mantle, 127 U. S. 348, 8 Sup. Ct. 1132; 
Davis v. Wiebold, 139 U. S. 507, 11 Sup. Ct. 628; 
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Butte iCity Smoke-House Lode Cases, 6 Mont. 397, 
12 Pac. 858; 
Silver Bow M. & M. Co. v. Clarke, 5 Mont. 378, 5 
Pac. 570; 
Talbott v. King, 6 Mont. 76, 9 Pac. 434. 
A cursory reading of the excerpts from these cases 
eontained in appellants' brief and a comparison there-
of with the citations in resondents' brief would lead the 
reader to conclude a continuous irreconcilable conflict 
existed in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States upon this question. An examination we 
think will find them distinguishable. 
Uinta Tunnel Mining & Transportation Company v. 
Creede (same case on writ of error in 196 U. S. 337, 23 
Sup. Ct. 266, 49 L. Ed. 501), was a case where~ 1 the 
plaintiff had located and received patent for two lode 
mining claims across the defendant's tunnel site, which 
tunnel in its course passed through plaintiff's claims 
beneath the surface. The issue was whether or not 
the defendant had the right of way along the bore of 
its tunnel through the lode claims of the plaintiff, 
which issue was to be determined by the priority be-
tween the respective claims. It was the contention of 
the plaintiff that its claims were located January 2, 
1892, and that the patents related back and took effect 
as of the dab of sueh locations. 'l'hc tunnel site loca-
tion had not gone to patent, but is location was madf: 
on January 13, 1892, and defendant alleged that no dis-
covery had been made within plaintiff's lode claims 
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until after defendant's tunnel site had been located. Tho 
trial court refused to permit defendant to prove such 
lack of discovery within plaintiff's claims. As already 
stated in this brief in our discussion of the Creede case 
the court held the certificates of location were not even 
evidentiary of the fact of discovery and the other facts 
therein stated, that while the patent related back to the 
initiation of the right, the date of such initiation must 
be proved, that there was no presumption other than 
that at the timc;J of entry the location had been perfected, 
the court saying (pp. 169-70): 
'' '* '* '* The marking of boundaries and 
filing of location certificates may precede dis-
covery or discovery may precede them, but no 
location is valid until both are complete. The 
earlier act then inures to the benefit of the lo-
cator as of the date of the later, subject to all 
rights which have intervened between them. 
(Cases cited). '* '* '* There was therefore 
no valid location of the lode claims until the dis-
coveries within them were made, and it is held 
by the circuit court of appeals of the Ninth cir-
cuit in Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler Min. Co., 
61 Fed. 557, 565, 9 C. C. A. 613, 621, that a patent 
for a mining claim only relates back to the time 
when a valid location was first made". 
The court in that case permitted such an inquiry in an 
action at law because it was no attack upon the prior 
patent ''to assert the rights of the claimant of a tunnel 
site located before the entry of the land against a pat-
ent of it to a lode claimant, because under the statutes 
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and the law such a patent always issues subject to those 
rights." (p. 169). r:rhe court further holding at page 
168: 
"Under the Revised States and the law the 
entries and patents of these claims vested the 
title to them subject to the rights of the prior 
claimant of the tunnel site just as they vested 
it subject to the right of an owner of an adjoin-
ing lode claim to follow on its dip through a 
side line and through the patented territory of 
these lode claimants any vein which has its apex 
in his claim. '' 
And at page 170 that the land department "was notre-
quired to determine and it did not decide the question 
here at issue, and under the statutes and the decisions 
of the federal courts the entries and the patents were 
made subject to the rights of the claimant of the tunnel 
site which had attached before the land department per-
mitted the entries". 
The case of Noyes v. Mantle was a bill in equity 
to quiet title. The plaintiff was the owner of a lode 
within the placer claim patented to the defendant. The 
lode had been located before the location of the placer. 
r:rhe court called attention to the law that placer loca-
tions and patents did not carry title to lodes therein 
"known to exist" unless such there be not then located 
to appropriate which the placer application and patent 
had contained a proper reference whereby to include 
them, and that a lode claim perfected prior to the loca-
tion of the placer is by law excepted from the placer 
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patent. There was and could be no conflict between 
the patents and there waR by that decision not an avoid-
ing of one but im<tead the definition of each. 
Davis v. \Viebold, Butte City Smoke-House Lode 
Cases, Silver Bow M. & M. Co. v. Clarke, and Tal-
bott ''· King all involved the question of priority of 
townsite patents over the locations of mining claims 
within such townsites. In Davis v. Wiebold townsite 
patents were held under the Act of Congress to convey 
title to no mines of gold, etc., known to exist on the 
issuance of the townsite patents. In that case patent 
had issued to the townsite before the mining claim had 
been located upon a vein therein. In the light of pres-
ent learning upon the subject it is apparent the Land 
Department had no jurisdiction whatever to issue the 
mineral patent, the government already by its townsite 
patent having divested itself of the entire title to thP 
land therein included.. rnw court so held, saying that 
the townsite patent would carry title to all mines with-
in the land pateuted not then known to exist. Davis v. 
Wiebold was an appeal from the Supreme Court of thu 
Territory of Montana and the Supreme Court of the 
United States in its decision in that case referred to 
the three remaining cases cited by appeJlants here, 
namely, Butte City Smoke-House Lode Cases, Silver 
Bow M. & M. Co. v. Clarke and Talbott v. King, as cases 
"in which very able and learned opinions were given 
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by the Supreme Court of the Territory of Montana", to 
which cases we will now refer. 
In each the Smoke-House Cases, Silver Bow M. & 
M. Co. v. Clarke and Talbott v. King the Supreme Court 
of the Territory of Montana was called upon to define 
a townsite patent with reference to the location or pat-
ent of a mining claim within the townsite, the location 
whereof had been made prior to the entry of the town-
site. Each of these suits was at law, apparently suits 
in ejectment, and in each of them the court held that 
there was no conflict between the mineral and townsite 
patents; each was valid and neither was restricted by 
the other because, as stated in Davis v. Wiebold, there 
was by Act of Congress expressly excepted from the 
townsite patent all mines and mining claims within the 
townsite then known to exist. As said in the Smoke-
House cases: 
"It was not possible for either to have ac-
quired any right or title to the property of the 
other by virtue of his patent. The patents do 
not cover or touch the same property. * * * 
''The Smoke-House location, being a valid 
mining claim at the time, was expressly excepted 
from the operation of the townsite patent, and it 
was not possible by such a patent to have ob-
tained any interest therein or title thereto. There 
is no conflict between a town-site patent and a 
mining claim patent, and can be none. They 
evidence separate and distinct grants and can-
not conflict with one another. The one conveys 
a mining claim, an independent grant, and the 
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other conveys ground for a town-site, from which, 
by the law, all valid mining claims and possess-
ions are excluded • • • The two titles take 
hold of and affect property that is entirely sep-
arate and distinct. 
''The officers of the land department had no 
authority to convey a mining claim by the is-
suance of a to·wnsite patent, and no authority to 
convey a town-site by the issuance of a mining-
claim patBnt. At the time of issuing the town-
site patent, they had no authority to declare that 
the Smoke-House location was not a valid mining 
claim and possession; and having no such author-
ity, they excluded from: the operation of the town-
site patent all mines, mining calims, and possess-
ions, as the law required. 
• 
''And now, why should the owners of the 
Smoke-House location have filed an adverse 
claim to the application for the town-site patent? 
They knew that the town-site patent, when issued, 
would exclude from its operation all valid mines, 
mining claims and possessions, and therefore 
they had no adverse claim. They could not ob-
ject to the issuance of the townsite patent, for 
it could not interfere with or in any manner af-
fect the Smoke-House location. Suppose they 
had filed an adverse claim, they would have been 
informed that they were meddling with what did 
not concern them. They would have been told 
that the townsite patent, when issued, could not 
touch the Smoke-House location. 
And after quoting at length from the opinion of Mr. 
Justice Field in the case of Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 
U. S. 392, the court continued: 
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"That is equivalent to saying, what we have 
already said in this decision, that the town-site 
patent took hold of the non-mineral lands includ-
ed within its limits, but did not touch or in any 
manner affect the mining claims therein;. and 
hence that the patent to the Butte town-site did 
not affect the Smoke-House location; and, fur-
ther, that there is not and cannot be any con-
flict between a town-site and a mining claim 
patent." 
All of which was both able and learned. 
Of course the judgment in each of the above cases 
was correct, but their relevancy to the issue now be-
fore this court is not apparent to respondents. There 
was no reservation in the patent to the Valentine Scrip 
of then known mines or mining claims, nor was such 
a reservation authorized by law. It is true only non-
mineral, unoccupied and unappropriated land could be 
purchased with Valentine Scrip and accordingly the 
Land Department was called upon, as was its duty, to 
determine the character of the land before the allow-
ance of the entry or issuance of patent therefor. The 
Land Department made its investigation and determined 
that the land was non-mineral, unoccupied and un-
appropriated and issued its patent in the performance of 
the duty Congress had imposed upon it, all within its 
jurisdiction so defined. There could be no greater con-
flict than that between the Valentine Scrip and the area 
of the McGuire & Company's placer within the scrip 
entry. The law did not except one from the other. One 
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completely excluded the other. When the Land De-
partment issued its patent to the Valentine Scrip its 
jurisdiction ceased with reference to that area and any 
other attempt on its part to deal with the title to the 
land so patented was under all the authorities wholly 
beyond its jurisdiction and wholly void. The law pro-
vided the method for review and courts of equity 
possessed the necessary powers on a proper application 
to correct imposition, fraud and mistake, but counsel 
have yet to refer us to an authority that will sanction 
in an action of ejectment such an inquiry. Appellants' 
attack upon respondents' patent is a collateral attack, 
to which respondents' patent, being the senior patent, 
by all authority is immune. 
Counsel cite the decisions of the Supreme Court 
of the Territory of Montana no doubt because the 
· definitions therein contained of a mining claim are 
favorable to their contention, a mining claim being 
therein defined as a grant in praesenti, a grant or sale, 
"a withdrawal thereby of so much of the public land. 
from sale or pre-emption", "a grant with the right 
to purchase the absolute title", "it is already sold and 
becomes private property which may be disposed of at 
the will of the owner", and that a mining patent re-
lates back to the date of locati.on, the presumption for 
bidding proof of discovery, marking on the ground and 
other essentials as to the validity of such location. In 
all of those respeciR, the opinions were neither verr 
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able nor learned, for the Supreme Court of the United 
States has refused to adopt such definitions of a mining 
location or such theory of relation of a mining patent 
to the date of location. Of course a mining claim is 
"property in the fullest sense of the word"-it may be 
sold, transferred and inherited-but there is no sal.! 
of the land located until the purchase price has bcun 
paid and accepted, receiver's receipt issued and the 
claim entered, much less is there a sale by the me I e 
filing with i;he district recorder of a notice of location 
or the posting thrreof on the claim. By the mere loca-
tion of a mining claim, even though it be a valid, per-
fected location, there is no sale or grant 1n praesenti, 
nor is the land so located withdrawn from the jurisdic-
tion of the Land Departmerrt---'quite the contrary, the 
Land Department has yet to dispose of that land, to see 
that all the conditions precedent to patent and the vest-
ing of title in the locator have been performed, of 
which there is none more import·ant than the determina-
tion of the mineral or non-mineral character of the land 
and the marking of the claim on the ground. That a 
patent does not relate back to the date of the notice 
of location or to the date of the posting thereof, unless 
upon that date there was a valid discovery and a mark-
ing of the claim on the ground, as to which neither the 
patent nor notice of location raises any presumption 
prior to entry, has been the unvarying decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States as indicated by 
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Creede & Cripple Creek Mining Co. v. Uinta Tunnel 
Mining Co., in 196 U. S. 337. 
In all of this counsel overlook the fact that the 
Land Department in the course of its duty and within 
its jurisdiction determined the land in question was not 
mineral, not occupied and not appropriated, and, act-
ing within that jurisdiction, conveyed the title to 
another, completely divesting itself of all jurisdiction 
with reference thereto. In the light of the decisions 
from which we have quoted, appellants could not in this 
suit at law successfully rely on their patent, were it 
valid, as raising any presumption whatever as to the 
validity of their placer location upon the occasion of 
the issuance of the Valentine Scrip patent or the entry 
of the land so patented. But the placer patent, having 
been issued at a time when the Land :Qepartment was 
without jurisdiction over the property included within 
the Valentine Scrip, was ·a nullity as to such area in 
conflict and could neither relate back to nor revive 
anything. 
Nor is there anything in the testimony offered in 
this case to indicate that the Land Department erred 
in its determination that the Valentine was non-
mineral in character, unoccupied and unappropriated. 
Land is not mineral unless it can be said that "mineral 
can be obtained from it in such quantity and quality as 
to make it more valuable for mining than for agricul-
ture'' or uses other than mining. 18 R. C. L. § 122, p. 
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1222. The testimony below was insufficient to establish 
a valid discovery. Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U. S. 313, 25 
Sup. Ct. 468, 49 L. Ed. 770, and Steele v. 'f1anana .Mines 
1~. Co., 148 ]'eel. 678. Iu tho latter case, which was a 
~mit in equity, the United States C5ircuit Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit hold: 
''The evidence of tho discovery of mineral 
on the placer claim is as follows: 'rho appellant 
testified that for about ten days prior to locating 
the claim he prospected the ground, and in so do-
ing panned frequently, with the result that in 
most instances he secured colors of gold and in 
some instances fairly good prospects of golrl. 
Another witness, one vVoocl ward, who was hi red 
to further prospcet on tho elaim, testified that 
the result of his panning 'showed colors of gol(l 
in each instance and many of such pans showed 
what miners and prospectors are in tho habit of 
calling 'good prospects' of gold.' Tho testimony 
of another witness was thni he panned seYeral 
pans of gravel and dirt on said claim and found 
colors of gold in each instance, and that, while 
there he saw se,·eral pans washed out by Mr. 
'Woodward with some\vhat better results, all of 
said pans contained colors readily and easily seen 
and in some instances quite a number of them. 
The sum and substance of this evidence is, not 
that gold had been discovered on the claim in 
such quantities as to justify a person of ordinary 
prudence in further expending labor and means 
with a reasonable prospect of snrrt~ss, hut that 
colors of gold han been found which were fairly 
good prospects of gold. Doubtless, colors of 
gold may he found by panning in the dry bed of 
any creek in Alaska, anc1 miners, upon such en-
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couragement, may be willing to further explore 
in the hope of finding gold in paying quantities. 
But such prospects are not sufficient to show that 
the land is so valuable for mineral as to take it 
out of the category of agricultural lands and to 
establish its character as mineral land when it 
comes to a contest between a mineral claimant 
and another claiming the land under other laws 
of the United States. 
Reduced to narrative form the testimony admitted 
upon the trial to prove a valid perfected location of 
the McGuire & Company's placer claim was merely 
the following: 
Michael Gibbons, a witness produced by the 
plaintiff, testified as follows: (Direct examina-
tion, Tr. 64-5-6). The character of the surface 
ground of the McGuire & Company placer at the 
time it was located was gravel, which at that 
time was being panned or sluiced for minerals and 
minerals were recovered. :All the way from 
where the Bingham & Garfield Depot is down 
through that gulch where this controversy is 
about Maxwell's property, and then right to the 
north of Stevie Hays' residence, which was north 
of the Maxwell ground, they was working there 
and they used to pan gold there. Mr. McGuire 
used to. I have seen him gold pan right from the 
town on that rim rock going down into the gulch 
on the McGuire placer, but the McGuire placer 
at the time I am speaking of was not located. The 
McGuire placer was panned down on the rim 
rock as far as they could go down. 
(Cross Examination, Tr. 70). The placer 
operations upon the McGuire claim ceased in the 
early 80s. Mr. McAvinney bought Mr. McGuire's 
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interest and operate(l a few years, but with his 
death the operation of the placer ceased and it 
has not been operated since. 
1'here was no testimony whatever aR to the moHu-
menting or marking of the elaim on the ground, 110 eom-
pliance is shown with the rull'S and regulations of the 
mining district, nor \Yere those rules or regulations 
offered in evidence. 
·we submit the tcstimoJJy below doe:-; JJot risn to tll'.' 
dignity of the rule staie(l in Nteele v. Tauana Mines R. 
Co., supra. Not that it was 011r posit ion lwlow that 
appellants should have hem1 pl~rmittl'd to pnwr a dis-
cove17, for we objected to tlH' ~ulmission of any testi-
mony relative therMo and such proof \\'as introducril 
hy appellants over our ohjPction an<l excnption, yl't on 
appellants' theory, which seems to us to confuRo nll di;,;-
tinctions between law and equitable aetions awl the re-
lief and defenses applicable thereto re;,;peetivcly, not 
only dol'H the area here in controversy appear non-min-
eral but ncitl1cr valid (liscovery upon the placer nor tlw 
mommH~nt ing tlwreof has he<'n pron~d and hence neither 
can be presumed 11pon the oeeaRion of tlw 'r alentine 
Scrip entry. 
But the dodrino emmcinter1 h.\' the d1•cisions of the 
Supreme Conrt of tlw 'I\·nitory of l\foutana cited by 
counsel and hcreinbefon~ di;oenssed \V('l'e repudiated h' 
the Supreme Court of the Rtat1' of Montana in the case 
of lior;,;ky v. :Moran, 21 Mont. :345, 53 Pac. 1064. That 
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suit was not in ejectment but was a suit in equity to 
quiet title to the land within a placer claim that had 
been located prior to the ('ntry of a townsite. ..:\Jthough 
the placer elaimant had negleetd doing any work upon 
his claim for nearly hve11ty years after the entry of the~ 
townsite, still the plaeer claim had never been relocated 
or forfeited and tlw placer claimant procee(lcd to rely 
upon these decisions of the Snpreme Court of the rrcr-
ritory of Montana cited by counsel. 'The court with 
reference thereto said (pp. 1065-G6-70): 
"He eites Milling Co. v. Clarke, 5 Mont. 
:378, 5 Pac. 570; rralhott V. King, G Mont. 7G, 9 
Pac. 4:34; King Y. rnwmas, 6 Mont. 490, 12 Pae. 
8G5; Butte City Smoke-House Lode Cases, I) 
Mont. 3£)7, 12 Pac. 858; * * * 
"It is from obscure language used in some 
of these decisions, mainly the phrase 'previously 
conveyed,' that confusion arises as to what con-
stitutes such an absence of authority as will au-
thorize a judgment of nullity on collateral 
attack. The Montana decisions relied upon by de-
fendant indicate this confusion. * * * 
'' * * '" What is the charaeter of th•] 
title obtaiued hy defendant to the lan<l in contro-
ven;y from l1is mining location! \Vas tlw land 
embraced therein previously dispo;,cd of b:' the 
govcrnmrnt. as far aR tlw tmnl-Ritc p;dent is con-
cerned'? T am well aware that in SC\'ernJ cases, 
11otahly Relic v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 2A8, and 
F'orlws v. Gracey, ~)4 U. S. 762, the title conferred 
by a mining loeatio11 is spoken of in tPrms of such 
high respl~et aR almost to justify tlw inferonct~ 
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that it is on a par with a title by patent, or one 
based on a certificate of final proof and pur-
chase; but surely the court, using this language 
in cases where vital existing rights or claims of 
rights were before it, did not intend such inference 
to be drawn and applied in aU cases. Before the 
holder of such a claim has made proof of his com-
pliance with the statutory requirements regulat-
ing the obtainment of a patent to his location, 
and paid the purchase price therefor, he has only 
an inchoate right to title, at best. He is under 
no obligations to make final proof, and pay the 
purchase price, so as to entitle him to patent. 
Mining Co. v. Bugbey, 96 U. S., on page 167. It 
is well to notice here that there is a clear dis-
tinction between the holders of a valid claim 
whose rights are possessory only, and one who, 
having fulfilled all the conditions required by law, 
has received or is entitled to a certificate of 
purchase. See Sherman v. Buick, 93 U. S. 209; 
Simmons v. Wagner, 101 U. S. 260; Land Co. v. 
Rawson, 62 Fed. 427. 
"There is no grant in praesenti, under the 
mineral laws, to the mere locator of a mining 
claim.'' 
'rhe court relied lar~ely upon U. S. v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 
378, which was a contest between a homesteader and 
certain townsite claimants within the Town of Grants-
ville, in Tooele County of this State, to which decision 
reference is made for the distinction between void and 
voidable patents and a definition of the jurisdiction of 
the Land Department and the courts with reference 
ihereto. 
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The Horsky suit was one in equity and the court 
held the defense of laches a good defense. The placer 
claimant having waitedt twenty years to assert his claim, 
was not entitled to equitable relief, and the court quoted 
with approval from the opinion of Mr. Justice Brewer 
in Naddo v. Bardon, 51 Fed. 495, 2 C. 'C. A. 337, as fol-
lows: 
''No doctrine is so wholesome, when wisely 
administered, as that of laches. It prevents the 
resurrection of stale titles, and forbids the spy-
ing out from the records of ancient and aban-
doned rights. It requires of every owner that 
he take care of his property, and of every claim-
ant that he make known his claims. It gives to 
the actual and long possessor security, and in-
duces and justifies him in all efforts to improve 
and make valuable the property he holds. It is 
a doctrine received with favor, because its proper 
application works out justice and equity, and 
often bars the holder of a mere technical right, 
which he has abandoned for years, from enforc-
ing it when its enforcement will work large in-
jury to many.'' 
How clearly applicable that quotation is to the facts 
of our case! Respondents, it seems to us, should not 
be denied that defense if appellants are in this action 
to be permitted to set aside the senior patent that this 
junior patent may have priority. 
Horsky v. Moran went to the Supreme Court of 
the United States, but the writ of error was dismissed 
because the decision below had been on the ground of 
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laches, wl1ich did not present a Federal question. The 
opinion by Mr .• Justice Brewer appears in 178 U. S. 
205, 20 Sup. Ct. 856, 44 L. Eel. 1038. It is worthy of 
note that the court adopted the definition of a mining 
location as stated by the Supreme court of Montana, 
saymg: 
" ·~ * * the apparent legal title passed 
to the probate ;judg·e, and thereafter to the plain-
tiff, and it was only an equitable and inchoate 
right which the defendant was trying to assert.'' 
II. 
Point. 
Appellants' action is barred by the provisions of Sec-
tions 6449 and 6450 of the Compiled Laws of Utah. 1917. 
Prior to tho year 1888 the Lam; of Utah did notre-
quire the payment of taxes as a eowlitio11 p1·ecc~dent to 
the acquisition of title by adverse posse>ssion, the seven 
year period of adverse possession being sufficient in it-
self. 
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1876, S<"rtion 10D7 to 1104, 
inclusive; 
Rio Grande Westeru Railway Co. v. Salt Lake InY. 
Co., :15 Utah 528, 101 Pac. 586, at 590; 
Rydalch v. Anderson, :n Utah ~)9, 107 Pac. 25. 
\Ve submit the following testimony is snfneient to justi-
fy finding No. II of the court below of title in respond-
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ents and fimling No. V as to the adverse character of 
the posses:-;ion of S. S. Maxwell, title thereby having 
been acquired by :Maxwell prior to the taking effect of 
Sections 31iW to 31:3~!, inelusive, Volume 2, Compile(] 
Laws of Utah, 1888. 
Mr .• Jerome Bouregard, a witness produced 
on bdwlf of re:-;pomlents testified on direct ex-
amination ('l'r. 2:3), that he had purchaseu Lot 6, 
clircetly auoss the street from Lot 10 or the Max--
-well lot, in 1880, and was (~ngaged in business 
on that location continuously from 1880 until the 
fall of 1D2::l; that he knew S. S. Maxwell and that 
in the late 70s or early 80s Maxwell built a cabin 
on Lot 10, almost directly across the street from 
Mr. Bouregard 's place of business on Lot 6, and 
1lax\Ydl lived in that cabin continuously up un-
til a short time before he died. ('rr. 25) Maxwell 
while he lived on Lot 10 occnpiecl it as the owner 
and the lot \VaR called the Maxwell lot. 
Mr. Bouregard also testified on direct ex-
amination ('l'r. 22) that he and his family had 
lived on Lot J1 immediately adjoining the Max-
well lot on tho south for twenty-five ~Tears; that 
while Maxwell was living ou Lot 10 Mr. Boure-
gard perhaps (lid have a little boundary dispute 
with Mr. Maxwell, who wanted to put a little 
garden along tho boundary between the two prom-
ises, lmt that was alL (Tr. 25-6). 
Mr. J. Fewson Smith, a witness produced on 
behalf of respondents, testified on direct ex-
amination (Tr. 27-8-~l) that he had made the snr-
vey shown on the (lra wi ug (Defendants' Exhibit 
78); that S. S. Maxwell was the man who daimed 
the lot thereon colored yellow, which was the 
same as Lot 10, Block 4, Plat "A", Wilkes Official 
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Survey of Bingham Townsite; that he had seen 
Mr. Maxwell and conversed with him; that his 
survey was made in the fall of 1898; that the 
double or hatched line around the left on the 
southeast corner of the lot was the outline of a 
rock wall which he located on the date of the sur-
vey; that Maxwell was living on that lot at the 
date of the survey. 
Mr. Smith testified on cross-examination (Tr. 
32) that Mr. Maxwell's statement to him was that 
he, Maxwell, claimed up to a certain point, and 
referring to the house of Mr. Bouregard, that he 
had fifty feet frontage; that Mr. Maxwell had 
asked nothing of Mr. Smith, but that the latter 
had asked Mr. Maxwell for his boundaries; that 
the witness wanted Mr. Maxwell to show the 
boundaries to him; that Mr. Bouregard stayed 
aloof for some reason, they did not get together, 
but the witness took Mr. Maxwell's statement. 
Dr. F. E. Straup, a witness produced on be-
half of respondents, testified on direct examina-
tion (Tr. 32-3-4) that in 1896 he was living in the 
house shown as Lot 12 on Plaintiffs' Exhibit B 
immediately south of the Maxwell lot and just be-
hind Mr. Bouregard 's house on Lot 11; that he 
met Mr. Maxwell right after moving into that 
house and bought the Maxwell lot from Mr. Max-
well in 1899; that he bought it because there was 
no yard about the house, Lot 12, where he was 
living, the house occupying the entire lot; that 
Mr. Maxwell and he discussed the ownership of 
the ground directly back of the Maxwell house 
and directly north of Lot 12; that the witness had 
been using that ground out of the necessity of his 
situation, but Mr. Maxwell protested his using 
it because Mr. Maxwell owned it and Dr. Straup 
had no right there; that the Doctor, therefore, 
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bought the Maxwell lot with the expectation of 
building on it; that when he bought the Maxwell 
lot it seemed to him there was a little wall or the 
representation of a wall between Maxwell's house 
and the store building next to it. 
On cross-examination (Tr. 38) Dr. Straup 
testified as follows: 
'' Q. And when you took the deed from Maxwell,· 
did you cause the title to be examined 7 
• 
''A. The house and the ground-no, I talked 
with Mr. Maxwell, and I had known him for 
a long time, and I talked with old timers in 
the camp there, and in those days we 
described and took our ground according to 
the occupancy and the usage claimed, and 
so forth. 
'' Q. You did not go through the formality or 
take the trouble of examining the record to 
see who really did own the record title¥ 
"A. No. I thought Mr. Maxwell had pretty 
good title to the ground. I knew that he had 
lived there, and I knew that he was on the 
ground. I know that he used the ground, 
and I thought he was entitled to the ground 
that he deeded to me, or else I would not 
have purchased it." 
Attention is called at this time to the deed from 
Mr. Maxwell to Dr. Straup (Defendants' Exhibit 1), 
which is a bargain and sale deed with covenants by Mr. 
Maxwell against encumbrances. 
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Dr. Albert L. Castleman, a witness produced 
011 behalf of respondents, testified on cross-ex-
amination (Tr. 48) that in purchasing the prop-
erty from Charles McCann he had assumed the 
title was good without investigation because ho 
knew tho history of tho previous occupants for 
quite a number of years, that is, from 1891 at 
which time he first went to Bingham, remaining 
thoro at that time throe and a half years, which 
was when Mr. Maxwell ~was living on the ground; 
that when the witneRs came hack to Bingham in 
1904 Mr. McCann was living there and Mr. Mc-
Cann showed him the deed from Dr. Straup or 
Maxwell. 
Michael Gibbons, a witness produced on be-
half of appellants, testified on direct examination 
(Tr. 58) that he had moved to Bingham in April 
of 1874 and resided in or spent most of his time 
there until 1910, barring a few years when he 
"worked in Idaho (Tr. 76-7); that he knew S. S. 
Maxvvell in Bingham and Mr. Maxwell spoke to 
him twice about wanting to got a title fixed up, 
to got a deocl for it, which was during the time 
Maxwell was living on this property, that Mr. 
Maxwell had gotten some money from Col. Wall, 
sold the J. Gould mine and that was about the 
elate tho witness could recall, and Mr. Maxwell 
spoke to him about getting the deed. He sai<l 
he had some money then and he wanted to fix up 
the title, but there was nothing done about it 
and he spoke to the witness again about it and 
said something about seeing Stove, whether 
Steve Hays or who it was that ho mentioned, but 
that is the last that was ever said about it, never 
got it fixed up. 
"Q. Did Mr. Hays over speak to you about any 
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claims he may have in the McGuire & Com-
pany Placer 1 
• 
MR. PARSONS: I object to that as m-
competent, irrelevant and immaterial. 
* 
THE GOUR''l': Is it your interpretation of 
this evidence that the talk-that this man 
Maxwell wanted to get the title fixed up, 
that that ~was a recognition 1 
MR. WALLACE: I think the inference 
most clearly from that is that that certainly 
was not adverse. 
(Argument and discussion). 
THE COURT: I don't see how that can 
be possible. You might buy a tax title on 
Mr. McBroom's lan<l, and he might talk with 
you about getting it fixed up. That does 
not change the character of his occupation 
of the land in any way, as I take it. Tt 
must be something more than that". 
The witness then testified (Tr. 79) that Mr. 
Stephen Hays had spoken to him a couple of 
times shortly after Mr. Hays had purchased the 
Valentine Scrip, about combining the two titles, 
1\Ir. Gibbons to give him half the placer and he to 
give l\Ir. Gibbons half the Valentine Scrip; that 
Mr. Gibbons at that time had a power of attorney 
from his sister, the appellant Rose Gibbons, but 
he didn't feel he could do anything ~with refer-
eHce to Mr. Hays' suggestion lest he might 
jeopardize his sister's interest. 
On recross-examination Mr. Gibbons could 
not fix the time of the above conversation with 
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Mr. Maxwell (Tr. 80) and he testified that Mr. 
Maxwell had occupied Lot 10 as nearly as he 
could recollect from 1878, 1879 or 1880; that the 
only way he could recollect about it was Mr. Mc-
Guire's telling him that he, Mr. McGuire, had 
given Mr. Maxwell permission to go on there; 
that the witness was there all those years and 
saw Mr. Maxwell living there during all of that 
time after he, Mr. Maxwell, had built his house; 
that (Tr. 82) he didn't know what Mr. Maxwell 
claimed; that Mr. Maxwell never claimed to him 
that he was a claimer of the title, that Maxwell 
was not a tenant, that Mr. M·cGuire was the one 
that let him go on there and the witness never 
interfered with him (Tr. 83), never asserted as 
against him any title that the witness or his 
associates might have in the placer claim, never 
did anything to him. 
The mere fact that the adverse claimant offers to 
purchase the owner's title in order to quiet the claim-
ant's title does not amount to a recognition of the 
owner's title nor will such offer stop the running of 
the statute. The trial court was correct in its comment 
above upon the nature of the testimony appellants pro-
pose to introduce. As was said in Oldig v. Fisk, 53 Neb. 
159, 73 N. W. 661, at 662: 
''A party in possession of land as owner 
certainly has a right to protect that possession by 
the purchase of any outstanding claim or lien 
against the property. There is not thereby any 
break in the possession, nor does the adverse 
occupant rely upon his purchased title in prefer-
ence to the one which he previously possessed. 
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He joins the two together, and possesses what-
ever title both may give him". 
See also: 
Weise v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 77 Neb. 40, 108 N. 
W. 175, (Aff. 208 U. S. 234, 28 Sup. Ct. 294, 
52 L. Ed. 466) ; 
Montgomery, Etc. Lumber C!o. v. Quimby, 164 CaL 
250, 128 Pac. 402. 
McAllister v. Hartzell, 60 Oh. St. 69, 53 N. E. 715, at 
718, where it is said: 
"It is conceded by the authorities that one 
in possession under a claim of title may offer to 
purchase without prejudice to that title. In this 
state color of title is not necessary to adverse 
possession . It is said that the offer to buy is an 
acknowledgment that the other has the legal title, 
and that such acknowledgment is fatal to the 
claim of adverse possession. But is iU Can a 
man not desire to buy his peace as reasonably if 
he knows he has no title as if he has title, or be-
lieves he has 7 Since it is not necessary that the 
holding be under claim of title, how can it be of 
consequence that there is no denial, but in fact 
is an admission, of the opposing title~ Nor is it 
necessary that a party should proclaim his pur-
pose in making an offer to buy. But, even 
though an offer to buy is an acknowledgment 
(for the second request embraces that), how 
does that destroy the adverse character of the 
possession? Whatever he acknowledges, what-
ever he says by way of acknowledgment, he 
still holds on to the possession; and it is the 
possession which, if unlawful, wrongs the other, 
and not the motive nor the belief of the possessor. 
It cannot help the case any that the intruder ad-
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mits the illegal character of his intrusion. By 
such a simple acknowledgment he neither says 
nor intimates that he will give up possession, nor 
that he will bold subject to the other, nor in 
recognition of his title. '_llhe opposite view results 
in magnifying the state of mind of the party, and 
dwarfing his acts. Its adoption \\rouhl, as we 
think, work an unwarranted interference wit11 
the beneficent operation of a statute intended to 
secure respoHc to titles alHl peace io neighbor-
hooiis". 
The testimony will of course he constn1ecl most favor-
ably to the finrlings. 
HoweYer the proof in this case shows without con-
tra(liction that the clefen<lants and their pre(lcccssors in 
interest have been in the continuous occupation and 
posession of the premises for the possession of which 
this suit has lH'Cn brought, aml the whole thereof, al-
ways improving the same and holding them under claim 
of title in fee simple, exclusive of all other rig·ht, ad-
versely to the pretended title of the plaintiffs for ::lear-
ly fifty years last past before the commencc,ment of this 
t-mit, a]](l the defendantR and their pn~<leenssors ~' ,d 
grantors have paid all taxes that have been levied :\11 1 
a sse sed upon the premise,; and the improvPmCJl ts there-
on aeeonling to law, at ](:ast from and including the 
~·ear 18Df:i to aucl including the year l!J24, ~with the single 
exception of those for the year 190:.?. 'J1lw proof as to 
the payment of taxes upon (1) the premises for the 
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possession of which this action is brought, and ( 2) Me-
Guire & Company's placer claim, is as follows: 
Lot 10, Block 4, McGuire & Company 
Plat "A", Bingham Placer Claim Defendant's Exhibit 
Number Year Amount Year Amount 
44 18D5 $1.00 1900 $ .64 
43 1896 1.17 1901 .60 
4-2 1897 1.98 1902 .57 
41 1898 1.72 190:3 .59 
40 1899 1.78 1904 .59 
:39 1900 2.68 1905 .66 
:38 1901 1.01 1906 .69 
:H 1903 3.04 1907 .78 
:H; 1904 3.15 1908 1.44-
:35 1905 7.70 1909 .81 
:34- 1906 21.50 1910 .81 
3:3 1907 28.60 1911 .78 
32 1908 ;):3.60 1912 .83 
31 1909 33.34 1913 .90 
30 1910 34.83 1914 .81 
29 1911 33.35 1915 .89 
2S 1912 38.87 1917 .72 
27 1913 41.97 1918 .35 
26 1914 51.84 1919 .78 
')~ ~D 1915 63.02 1920 1.09 
24 1916 74.01 1921 1.27 
23 1917 71.16 1922 1.15 
')'J 
_._. 1918 65.98 1923 1.17 
21 1919 87.15 1924 1.16 
79 1 !)20 113.m) 
20 1!)21 119.72 rr011AL .. $20.08 
19 1922 ] 18.32 
18 1923 110.00 
17 1924- 101.38 
ToTAL .... $1266.96 
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Proof of the payment of the taxes on Lot 10 was 
by introduction of the duplicate tax receipts issued from 
the office of the Treasurer of Salt Lake County, being 
the Defendants' Exhibits 17 to 44, both inclusive, and 
the certified copy of the redemption certificate cover-
ing taxes for the year 1920, being Defendants' Exhibit 
79. These tax receipts show upon their face for each 
of the years 1895 to 1924, both inclusive, the year 1902 
alone excepted, the name of the owner against whom 
the assessment was made, the description of the prop-
erty assessed, the valuation of the real estate and im-
provements, the amount of the tax, the book, page and 
line where the assessment may be found, with a recita-
tion of the payment thereof and the date of such pay-
ment. Appellants only objection to this proof is that 
it does not identify the one making the payment. Appel-
lants offered no testimony to the effect that the taxes 
for any year were paid by one other than him to whom 
the property had been assessed. They recognized no 
burden of proof whatever upon their part resulting 
from the case made by respondents. 
Of course there is no record in this state from 
which one may ascertain by whom taxes have been paid 
and the proof of that fact is impossible in case of 
the death or absence of persons who have appeared in 
the chain of title, unless there be indulged a presump-
tion in the absence of anything appearing to the con-
trary that taxes have been paid by the owner to whom 
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they were assessed, it being unreasonable to suppose 
the taxes were paid by anyone else. The case made by 
respondents should have been sufficient to have shifted 
to appellants the hurdtm of proving the payment hy 
another of the taxes assessed against respondents anu 
their predecessors in title. Houghton v. Barton, 4-!) 
Utah 611, 165 Pac. 4-71, at 4-75. So far as these parties 
were available respondents proved the payment of taxes 
by them. Dr. Straup testified he had paid the taxes 
that were assessed upon Lot 10 and the improvements 
while he was the owner thereof, that is, between May 26, 
1899, and May 8, 1901, (Tr. :14-, :)7, 39, 4-0, 4-1). Dr. 
Castleman testified he had paid the taxes that were 
assessed upon this property while he was the owner 
thereof, that is, between October 5, Hl04-, and March 
30, 1907, ('rr. 4-3, 4-9, 50). Dr. C. N. Ray testified he 
had paid the taxes that were assessed upon the prop-
erty \vhile he was the owner thereof, that is, between 
March 30, 1907, and June 30, 1913, (Tr. 52, 53, 54). 
Michael Gibbons testified (Tr. 85, 86) that he and his 
associates, whom he represented, paid taxes on the 
placer claim valued as a placer claim at the rate of $2.50 
or $5.00 per acre, as the case might be, as provided by 
statute and that such were the only taxes Michael Gib-
bons and his associates interested in the placer 
ever had paid on that claim. Appelants put in evidence 
(Tr. 96 to 100) the taxes paid by them and their 
associates on the McGuire & Company placer for the 
years 1900 to 1924, both inclusive. 
However, counsel admit the testimon,v oven upon 
their theory shows a payment of taxes upon Lot 10 as 
such for each of the years 1904 to 1912, both inclusive, 
by Dr. Castleman and Dr. C. N. Ray, but this counsel 
seck to avoid by arguing that the assessments upon Lot 
10 and those upon the placer claim were donhlc assess-
ments and, because the payments of the taxes levied UlJ-
on Lot 10 wore not made for seven consecutive years 
at a time before the taxes on the placer claim wore paid, 
the respondents must fail in their effort to cstahl ish 
title by adverse possession. 
It must be clear from tho record in this case that 
the only value Lot 10 possesses, or over has possessed, 
since the occupancy and improvement thereof by S. S. 
Maxwell in 1878, is that for residence, a town lot used 
for nearly fifty years last past for residence and the 
semi-public usc as tho office of physicians and surgeons 
and as the sib of hospitals for the care and treatment 
of the sick and injured in the town of Bingham Can-
:-on and vicinity. Obviously such value is and always 
has been separate, apart and distinct from any value 
that could appertain to the mining claim and of course 
it has over at least the years 1895 to 10:24, both in-
clusive, boon separately assessed accordingly. A com-
parison over tho period 1000 to 1924, inclusive, of the 
total assessed valuations upon this town lot of 50 x 100 
feet with its improvements, in round numbers $42,495.00 
(taxes paid $1150.00) with the total assessed valuation 
upon the entire McGuire & Oompany placer of l 1.77 
acres, in round numberR $1015.00 (taxes paid $20.00) 
must forcibly impress one with the existence of this 
separate and distinct value. As already noted Mr. Gib-
bons testified that the placer claimant had paid taxes 
only upon the placer claim at the statutory valuation of 
$2.50 or $5.00 per acre, as the case might be. 
Accordingly appellants find themselves squarely 
within the rule announced hy this court in the cases of 
Utah Copper Company v. Chandler, 45 Utah 85, 142 
Pac. 1119, and Utah Copper Company v. Eckman, 47 
Utah 165, 152 Pac, 178. 
Mr. George Y. Wallace, of appellants' counsel, is 
as we all know the author of "Wallace's Utah Index-
Digest", and we find in that work on the second page 
under the title of "Adverse Possession", sub-title 
"Mining Ground", the following: 
''Inasmuch as mining claims and surface 
rights can be separately assessed for taxation, 
adverse possession can be acquired of surface 
rights, although owHer of claim paid all taxes 
assessed against claim". 
citing the Chandler and Eckman cases. That is what 
we have thought this court decided in those cases and 
we are content with counsel's definition. We also pre-
sume that if one claims the estate in the surface as well 
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as the estate beneath and the latter be denied him, his 
claim of the surface continues unimpaired. 
The rule announced by this court in the Chandler 
and Eckman cases has become a rule of property in 
this jurisdiction, upon which respondents had a right 
to rely in their several purchases of Ijot 10 and in the 
erection thereupon by the respondent Utah Copper 
Company of its hospital at so substantial a cost. Utah 
Copper Company in the Chandler and Eckman cases 
urged upon this court contentions somewhat similar 
to those now made by appellants and therein Utah Cop-
per Company failed in resisting a claim of adverse 
possession by another. This court in those cases 
announced the rule in obedience to and reliance upon 
which Utah Copper Company purchased Lot 10 in the 
fall of 1924 and made its very substantial expenditure 
thereupon. The rule so announced in the Chandler and 
Eckman cases should not now be varied or reversed 
again to the defeat of Utah Copper Company and to 
confiscation of its investment. The Chandler and Eck-
man cases are so clearly applicable to the issues now 
before this court that we feel we should not by further 
reply to counsel's effort to distinguish them, add to the 
great length of this brief. 
III. 
Point. 
The appellants are estopped to deny respondents' title. 
The proof in this case shows we think without 
contradiction: 
That Lot 10 lies within the boundaries of the Val-
entine Scrip as described in the patent therefor, which 
patent issued July 10, 1876, and was recorded July 25, 
1876, nearly four years before the recording in the 
O'ounty Recorder's office of the notice of location of the 
McGuire & Company's placer claim, and twenty-one 
years before the recording of the placer patent. (Plain-
tiffs' Exhibit A, Abstract of Title entries 1, 4 and 28). 
That S. S. Maxwell entered into possesion of the 
premises herein involved in 1878, 1879 or 1880, to which 
John McGuire, one of the o\vners of the McGuire & Com-
pany's placer claim consented. (Tr. 81). Maxwell 
immediately built a cabin upon the premises and lived 
there continuously thereafter, making the premises his 
home until he sold them to nr. F. E. Straup on May 
26, 1899. At some time during his occupancy S. S. Max-
well partially inclosed Lot 10 with a rock wall. Max-
well's possession of these premises was at all times un-
der claim of title in fee simple, exclusive of all other 
right and adversely to the pretended title of appellants 
and their predecessors and grantors. The testimony 
defining Maxwell's possession has been discussed in 
Part II of this brief. 
Maxwell conveyed Lot 10 to Dr. F. E. Straup by 
bargain and sale deed on May 26,1 1899, Maxwell thereby 
covenanting against encumbrances as follows: 
'' * * * the said party of the first part, 
for himself and his heirs, executors and admin-
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istrators, does lwrehy covenant and agree, to and 
with the said party of the second part, his heirs 
and assigns, that he has not made, done, com-
mitted, executed or suffered any act or acts, thing 
or things whatsoever whereby, or hy means 
whereof, the said premises, or any part or parcel 
thereof, no\V are, or at any time hereinafter shall, 
or may be impeached, charged, or incumbered, in 
any manner or way whatsoever''. 
This deed was recorded .January 9, 1900, in the office of 
the County Recorder of Salt Lake County (defendants' 
Exhibit 1). Dr. Straup paid for the premises so con-
veyed in cash $95.00 and gave his note to Maxwell for 
$400.00, the balance of the purchase price, securing the 
same by mortgage dated May 26, 1899, recorded .June 
5, 1899, (defendants' Exhibit 2) which mortgage was 
satisfied by certificate dated January 8, 1900, and 
recorded January 9, 1900. (Defendants' .BJxhibit 3). 
Dr. Straup and his neighbors fixed the boundary 
between their several premises by agreement made Oc-
tober 23, 1899, which agreement was recorded May 17, 
1901 (defendants' Exhibit 4). Dr. Straup did not act-
ually live upon the property, but his possession during 
the period of his ownership cannot be questioned upon 
the record. Dr. Straup sold the premises to Charles 
McCann May 8, 1901, for the sum of $:395.00. The con-
veyance bearing that date was recorded May 13,1901 (de-
fendants' Exhibit 5). Mr. McCann actually lived upon 
the premises during his ownership thereof and on Oc-
tober 3, 1904, took a quit-claim deed thereto from S. 
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Hays and wife for the stated consideratiou of $1.00 
(defendants' Exhibit 6), which deed was recorded Oc-
tober 1:2, 1D04. S. Hays was the then reconl owner of 
the Valentine Scrip and the quit-claim deed to McCann 
is in statutory form. Charles McCiann sold and con-
\·eycd the premises to A. L. Castleman for the considera-
tion of $900.00 by deed clate<l October 5, 1904 (defend-
ants' "B~xhihit 6-B), which deed was recorded October 
] :2, 1904. 
Dr. Castleman testified on direct examination ('l'r. 
4:2) that there was a two-room cottage on the lot w heu 
he bought it, and that he rented the place to one Far-
rington Carr until the following spring, when Dr. 
Castleman took possession and built a two-story build-
mg on the ground at the cost of about $2000.00. (Tr. 
43) As soon as that house was completed Dr. Castle-
man moved in and continued to live there, using the 
premises as his residence and a physician's and sur-
geon's ofiice or emergency hospital until he sold them 
to Dr. C. N. Ray on March 30, 1907, which conveyance 
(defendants' ]Jxhibit 7) was recorded May 2;3, 1910. 
Dr. Castleman further testified on direct examina-
tion that he was then and has been at all times since 
a practicing physician and he then took care of the 
sick and injured employes of the Utah Copper Com-
pany and Boston Consolidated Mining Company in 
those days, and has continued in charge of their treat-
ment ever since. The witness testified that he had had 
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a number of associates in his practice; first he had 
formed a partnership with Dr. Worthington, then Dr. 
C. N. Ray became associated with the partnership, Dr. 
Ray residing upon Lot 10, and following Dr. C. N. Ray 
and in charge of the business office or hospital were 
Drs. D:. H. Ray, 0 'Brien and Frazier, the respondent 
Frazier being Dr. Castleman's representative in Bing-
ham at the time of the trial below. (Tr. 44) That dur-
ing all that time, until and including the time of trial, 
Lot 10 and the improvements thereon had been used for 
residence and doctors' office and emergency hospital 
and the occupation thereof by Dr. Castleman and those 
whom he subsequently put in charge there was always 
that of the owner of the premises; that duruing that 
time none of the McGuires or Gibbons or Tiernan ever 
made any demand for possession of the premises, nor 
any claim of title with reference thereto, so far as came 
to the witness' knowledge. (Tr. 45) After Dr. C. N. 
Ray purchased the premises, the latter added four 
rooms at the cost of about $2000.00, one of which rooms 
was used for an operating room and the three others 
had hospital beds, which addition was built in 1908 or 
1907. This building burned down and then the lot \Vas 
sold to Utah Copper Company, which company built a 
residence and office and emergency hospital thereupon 
at the cost of $23,000.00, and thereof the witness was 
still in charge. 
On cross examination Dr. Castleman testified ( Tr. 
7:?. 
47) that when he purchased from Charles McCann he 
did not get an abstract of title nor employ an attorney 
to pass on the title for him. It was his recollection that 
McCann had procured a deed from S. Hays before he 
sold to the witness; that he did not know just what the 
Hays deed meant to the title other thau that every-
body there seemed to want one. McCann showed him 
the deed from Straup or Maxwell or some predecessor 
and probably the Hays deed, but the witness asBumcd 
the title was all right without investigation, because he 
knew the history of the previous occupants for quite a 
number of years. (Tr. 48-49). 
The testimony of Dr. C. N. Ray (Tr. 51) was much 
the same as that of Dr. Castleman. Dr. C. N. Ray pur-
chased Lot 10 March 30, 1907, as hereinbefore stated, 
for the sum of $4000.00, and sold it to Dr. Davison H. 
Ray and Dr. Bernardo S. 0 'Brien June 30, 1913, the 
deed therefor (defendants Exhibit 8) being recorded 
November 1, 1913. Dr. Ray testified that during the 
period of his ownen;hip none of the McGuires, Gibbons 
or Tiernan made any demand upon him for the prem-
ises, nor any claim thereto whatever; (Tr. 52) that when 
he purchased the property from Dr. Castleman he did 
not cause an examination of the title to be made but 
simply assumed that Dr. Castleman had a good title 
and took it accordingly. 
On .July 2, 1913, Drs. D. H. Ray and O'Brien mort-
gaged (defendants' Exhibit 10) the premises to The 
73 
Oitizens State Bank of Bingham to secure their note 
in the principal sum of $3000.00, which mortgage was 
recorded .July 5, 191i}, and that mortgag1~ was discharged 
December 1, 1 DlA-, and certificate thereof (defendants' 
mxhibit 11) was n~eonled December f>, 1914. By deed 
dated April 19, 1917 (defendants' Exhibit 9) Dr. Ber-
nardo S. O'Brien and wife conveyed their undivided 
one-half iutere~:;t in Lot 10 to Dr. Davison H. Hay, which 
deud was reconlecl May 10, 1917. Dr. Davison H. Ray 
died and the premises were thereafter on Deeemher 
29, 1922, in the course of the probating of his estate, dis-
tributed to his widow, Elizabeth K. Ray, the devisee un-
der his will, (plaintiffs' Exhibit A, abstract of title 
entry 85) which order of distribution was duly recorded 
January 2, 1923. 
Imizabeth K. Ray conveyed Uw premises by war-
ranty deed (clufenuants' Exhibit 12) dated November 
21, 1922, to respondent R .G. F'razier for the sum of 
$7000.00, which deetl was recorded September 19, 1924. 
R. G. F'razier antl 'vife conveyed the premises by 
warranty deeds (defendants' Exhibits 13 and 14) dated 
r8spectively September :.w, 1~)24, and October :30, 1924, 
which deeds were recorded November 25, 1924. 
The proof further shows (Plaintiffs' IjJxhibit A, 
Abstract of 'ritle, FJntry No. 16) that the plaintiff Rose 
Gibbons on September 20, 1900, by formal power of 
attorney appointed Michael Gibbons ht~l' agent to tran-
sact all business pertaining· to the McGuire & Company 
placer claim, which power of attorney was revoked on 
October 16, 1909, by instrument appearing as Entry No. 
17 of that abstract. By Entry No. 18 we are informed 
appellant Austin K. Tiernan on September 4, 1901, by 
formal power of attorney designated Michael Gibbons 
his agent in his behalf, of which power of attorney there 
has been no revocation. At Entry No. 23 appears a 
power of attorney by Lucile Tiernan, the wife of the 
appellant Austin K. Tiernan, dated May 1, 1907, like-
wise formally appointing Michael Gibbons her agent in 
this behalf, which power has not been revoked. 
Michael Gibbons testified (Tr. 69) that at the 
time of the trial below he was about 77 years of age 
and (Tr. 58) that he came to Bingham on the 
15th day of April, 187 4, and resided there ever 
since, with the exception of a few years when he 
was working in Idaho, and also with the excep-
tion of the period from 1910 to 1920, during 
which he was in Bingham very little. He further 
testified (Tr. 66) that he was one of the owners 
of the McGuire & Company placer at the time of 
trial. 
And on cross-examination (Tr. 69) that dur-
ing the years from 1910 to 1920 he resided in 
Salt Lake City, although during that time he 
still had business interests in Bingham, ( Tr. 72) 
that when a resident of Bingham Canyon he 
lived on the Valentine Scrip near the section 
line, seventy-five or eighty feet west of the 
westerly side line of the McGuire & Company 
placer, this section line being the North boundary 
of the Valentine Scrip; he lived there twenty-five 
or thirty years, and that was his headquarters 
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when he first went to Bingham and continued 
to be such (Tr. 73) until the death of his wife 
in 1910; that he acquired his interest in the 
placer about the year 1898, his present interest 
being a three-tenths interest. 
And on re-direct examination ('Tr. 74) that 
the appellant Rose Gibbons was his sister-in-law; 
that while she did not reside in Bingham Can-
yon she might visit or stay out there a couple of 
weeks on a visit or something of that kind, which 
would be prior to 1900; that the appellant Tier-
nan had never resided in Bingham outside of 
trips there. 
And on re-cross examination (Tr. 81) that 
he was there all the years Mr. Maxwell occupied 
Lot 10 and saw Mr. Maxwell living on that lot 
during all of that time, and he saw Mr. McCann 
afterwards living there and had heard that Dr. 
Straup had purchased the lot from Maxwell, and 
he knew that Dr. Castleman was living there and 
had heard that Castleman had bought it, and 
after Dr. Castleman he saw Dr. Ray living there 
and had heard that he had purchased the prem-
ises, but he was not sure that he knew that some-
one moved in when Dr. C. N. Ray moved out, 
although he testified that people might move in 
or move out, ( Tr. 82) that he had never served 
any notice or interfered with Maxwell, Straup, 
McCann, Castleman, C. N. Ray, D. H. Ray, 
Frazier or the Utah Copper Company or made 
any demand upon them for the property or to 
that effect and never asserted any title against 
any of them, either on his own behalf or that 
of his associates, never said anything to them, 
but that during that period he witnessed the 
building of those houses and knew of it, (Tr. 83) 
and that going up and down the canyon he knew 
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that they were enlarging the place when Dr. 
Castleman got it, that while Maxwell's holdings 
there were very limited they kept on increasing 
and increasing until they built this last hospital 
which took the fnll width of the patent on the 
west side, and (Tr. 90) that in a way all of his 
co-tenants kind of looked to him with t·eferencP 
to the placer, yet at the same time when he would 
stop and visit Mr. Tiernan or give them his 
j7tdgment, giving them his ideas of what ought 
to be done at the tJ:me, they all seemed to be kind 
of indifferent, so after his sister-in-law with-
drew her power of attorney, revoked it, October 
16, 1!)19, (Plaintiffs Exhibit A, Abstract of Title 
Entry No. 17) he j7tst thought that if they want-
ed to let things .rJo their 'way, let it go. 
rrhc possession of the respondents and their pre-
decessors in interest over the past fifty years \Vas of 
course open and notorious. The Valentine Scrip pat-
ent and the conveyance and mortgages evidencing their 
transactions with reference thereto were each promptly 
recorded upon the execution thereof, and their several 
improvements and changes of possession incident to 
their several sales and transfers were likewise ever be-
fore the eyes of Michael Gibbons, the agent, and with-
in the knowledge of appellants, actual as well as con-
structive. It is evident that either appellants did not 
think they had a right or they concluded to abandon it. 
In our opinion these facts raise an estoppel against the 
appellants' attack upon rero;pondents' title. As said in 
Godeffroy v. Caldwell, 2 Cal. 489, 56 Am. Dec. 360, 361: 
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"It is a well-settled rule of all courts of 
equity, that the owner of land who stands by and 
sees another sell it, without making known his 
claim, is forever estopped from setting up his 
title against an innocent purchaser. In strict 
analogy to this rule, it is also a familiar principle, 
that one who knowingly and silently permits 
another to expend money upon land, under a 
mistaken impression that he has title, will not 
be permitted to set up his right.'' 
And in Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. South Etc., R. Co., 
84 Ala. 570, 3 South. 286, 5 A. S. R. 401, 407: 
"It is a sound and honest rule of f~qui ty, 
supported by principles of justice as well as of 
public policy, that if one, knowingly though pas-
sively suffers another to purchase and spend 
money on land, under circumstances which in-
duce an erroneous opinion or mistaken belief of 
title, without making known his claim, he shall 
not afterwards, in a court of conscience at least, 
be permitted to successfully assert any right or 
title against the purchaser". 
And in 10 R. C. L., § 97, page 782: 
" * * * it is a rule almost of universal 
application that one who stands by and sees 
another purchase land or enter upon it under a 
claim of right, and permits such other to make 
expenditures or improvements under circum-
stances which would call for notice or protest, 
cannot afterwards assert his own title against 
such person, * * * '' 
Attention is also respectfully directed to the text 
in 21 C . • T. at the pages mentioned, in support of which 
a multitude of decisions may there be found. At pages 
1154 and 1155 the following: 
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''An owner of property who stands by and 
sees a third person selling or mortgaging it un-
der claim of title without asserting his own title 
or giving t lw purchaser or mortgagee any notice 
thereof is estopped, as against sueh purchaser or 
mortgagee, from nftorwnnl asserting his title. 
And although title does not pass under these cir-
cumstances, a eonveyancu will be decreed hy a 
court of equity. '~ '~ * " 
n t page 11 GO, the following: 
"One ~who with lmo,dcdge of the facts awl 
without objection suffers another to make im-
provements or expenditures on, or in connedion 
with, l1is property, or in derogation of his rights 
under a claim of title or right, will be eRtopped to 
deny such tith' or right to tlw prejudice of thai 
other who lws ncl<'d in reliane•~ on and been mis-
led hy his eonduct ; * * * " 
at page 1166 the following: 
"Where a person h<wing a claim sees ~moth­
er doing an aet inconsistent therewith, and stanclrl 
by in such a manner as to induce the person 
doing the act, and who might otherwise have ab-
stained from it, to helieve that ho assents to its 
doing, he cannot aftcnvard be he11rd to complain 
of it. * * * '' 
and at pages 1~16 and el7 the following-: 
''Acquiescence as a ddcns(~ lm:.:;, gt'IH'rally 
speaking, a dnnl natnre; it rna~~, upon the mw 
hand, rest npon the prinriple of ratification, an<l 
be denominat(•d 'implie1l rntification' or, upon 
the other hawl, rest upon the principle of t~stop­
pel, and he d<>llominnted 'cquitnllle estoppel'. 
Where a person with actual or constrnetiYc 
knowledge of the facts induces another l)y hiR 
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words or conduct to believe that he acquiesces in 
or ratifies a transaction, or that he will offer no 
opposition thereto, and that other, in reliance 
on such belief, alters his position, snch person is 
estopped from repm1iating the transaction to the 
other's prejudice. And this is so regardless of 
the particular intent of the party whose ac-
quiescence induces action". 
CONCLUSION. 
Appellants have neither right, title nor intere>st in 
the premises herein involved because ( 1) the Valentine 
Scrip patent took the government's title thereto and 
the junior placer patent was void, (2) responclents long 
ago acquired. by adven;e possession the title to said 
premises and appellants' action relative thereto 1s 
barred. by the provisions of Sections 6449 and 6450, of 
the Compiled Laws of the State of Utah, 1917, and (3) 
appellants by their silence and acquiescence over nearly 
fifty years last past, with knowledge of the claims of 
title by respondents and their predecessors in interest, 
their several possessions, sales, purchases, transfers, 
mortgages and agreements with reference thereto, the 
expenditure of large sums thereupon and the frequent 
improvement thereof, arc estopped to deny respondents' 
title. Respondents, therefore, are entitled to an 
affirmance of the judgment of dismissal made and en-
tered by the court below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DICKSON, ELLIS, PARSONS & ADAMSON, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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